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From StephanKinsella.com:

I have mentioned before my year obtaining an LL.M. in international business law at the University of London, 1991–1992, after law school. I had to take at least half my courses from King’s College London, my “base” school, and took the other half from the London School of Economics. My favorite course in the program was “The International Law of Natural Resources,” taught by Professor Rosalyn Higgins at LSE—now Dame Higgins and later the first woman on the International Court of Justice.

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Theodore H. Moran, Gerald T. West, and Keith Martin, eds., International Political Risk Management: Needs of the Present, Challenges for the Future (World Bank, 2008) (pdf; 2)

The main subjects discussed in this publication, International Political Risk Management: Needs of the Present, Challenges of the Future, -providing coverage based on bilateral investment treaties (BITs), unifying terrorism and traditional political violence insurance, incorporating recent experiences in the power sector in risk management plans, and improving protection against regulatory takings-are at the core of investors’ concerns in the current marketplace. The book is organized into 4 parts. Part I discusses new perspectives on political risk insurance products. Part II examines private power projects in emerging markets. Part III focuses on the challenge of managing regulatory risk and Part IV deals with the international political risk insurance industry in 2010.

Cites the earlier, first edition (2005) of my own work in this field, International Investment, Political Risk, and Dispute Resolution: A Practitioner’s Guide, Second Edition (Oxford University Press, 2020).

Earlier version: Theodore Moran and Gerald T. West, eds., International Political Risk Management: Looking to the Future (World Bank, 2005) (pdf).

See also Tosun, The Law of Political Risk Insurance.

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The Law of Political Risk Insurance

Özge Tosun, The Law of Political Risk Insurance (Springer 2025).

 This book explores the scope of host states’ sovereign powers and the rights of foreign investors. Investors from developed countries engage in business with developing countries for various purposes, including political reasons, expanding and diversifying their operations, accessing essential natural resources and skilled labor forces, lowering their production costs, and in some cases, even mitigating global warming. Correspondingly, in order to attract foreign investment, host countries can provide incentives or make concessions. However, once the investment has been made, these ventures are vulnerable to the actions of the host state.

Political risk insurance, as the name suggests, serves to protect investments made in foreign countries where the sovereigns are more likely to interfere in the business activities of foreign investors.

This book offers a comprehensive understanding of the general mechanics of each main type of political risk, the entities responsible for these risks, insurers, their unions, and the subrogation process. Bridging the fields of investment law, insurance law, and international law, it offers valuable insights from both practical and academic perspectives.

Looks great, and cites my own work in this field, “Reducing Political Risk in Developing Countries: Bilateral Investment Treaties, Stabilization Clauses, and MIGA & OPIC Investment Insurance,” New York Law School Journal of International and Comparative Law 15 (1994): 1–48, which was later developed into a lengthier treatment, International Investment, Political Risk, and Dispute Resolution: A Practitioner’s Guide, Second Edition (Oxford University Press, 2020).

See also Moran et al., International Political Risk Management: Needs of the Present, Challenges for the Future.

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Paul E. Comeaux & N. Stephan Kinsella, “Reducing Political Risk in Developing Countries: Bilateral Investment Treaties, Stabilization Clauses, and MIGA & OPIC Investment Insurance,” New York Law School Journal of International and Comparative Law 15, no. 1 (1994): 1–48

This article, co-authored with my law school friend and colleague Paul Comeaux, summarizes ways international investors could reduce or respond to political risk in host states. This article was a synthesis of some previous articles my friend Comeaux and I had written, namely:

These articles, in turn, were inspired, in part, by a course, “The International Law of Natural Resources” that Paul and I took at the London School of Economics when pursuing our LL.M. degrees at the University of London in 1991–92. The course was taught by one of the world’s leading international law experts, the extremely impressive Rosalyn Higgins, later president of the International Court of Justice, and author of many influential works, such as Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It.

This article led to our book Protecting Foreign Investment Under International Law: Legal Aspects of Political Risk (Dobbs Ferry, New York: Oceana Publications, 1997), which, in turn, led to a later book, International Investment, Political Risk, and Dispute Resolution: A Practitioner’s Guide, by me and Noah D. Rubins (Oxford, 2005) and a second edition with me, Rubins, and Thomas N. Papanastasiou (Oxford 2020).

I go into more detail about some of this in New Publisher, Co-Editor for my Legal Treatise, and how I got started with legal publishing.

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“Political Risk” (1997)

Paul E. Comeaux and N. Stephan Kinsella, “Political Risk,” Chapter I.1 in Transnational Contracts, Vol. 1, edited and compiled by Charles Stewart (Dobbs Ferry, New York: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1997) (pdf; text below).

See also Rubins, Papanastasiou & Kinsella’s International Investment, Political Risk, and Dispute Resolution: A Practitioner’s Guide, Second Edition.

Chapter 1  Political Risk

  • In this chapter, we discuss the general nature of political risk: the various types or manifestations of political risk, factors that contribute to political risk, and ways that investors can assess the political risks inherent in particular investment regimes or with respect to certain investments.

[continue reading…]

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Lithuania’s Proposed Foreign Investment Laws: A Free-Market Critique

Below is the text of Lithuania’s Proposed Foreign Investment Laws: A Free-Market CritiqueRussian Oil & Gas Guide p. 60 (Vol. 3, No. 2, April 1994). [See also Comments on Draft Law on Stimulation of Foreign Investments in Romania.]

This resulted from the following project: Comments on Draft Project of “Law on Foreign Capital Investment in the Republic of Lithuania, Memorandum to Mr. M. Černiauskas, President, Association of Lithuanian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (November 18 1993). I have appended this text below as well.

Lithuania’s Proposed Foreign Investment Laws: A Free-Market CritiqueRussian Oil & Gas Guide p. 60 (Vol. 3, No. 2, April 1994).

Lithuania’s Proposed Foreign Investment Laws:  A Free Market Critique

N. Stephan Kinsella Jackson & Walker, L.L.P. Houston

[For current author info as of 12-2001: see: www.stephankinsella.com]

February 1994

Draft Submitted to The Russian Oil & Gas Guide

May differ slightly from version published in: The Russian Oil & Gas Guide, vol. 3, no. 2 (April 1994), p. 60

[Some formatting does not match published version]

  1. Introduction

Are foreign investors welcome in Lithuania?  The answer to this question depends upon whether Lithuania is willing to protect investors’ property rights so that they have an incentive to invest their capital in a risky regime.  A government’s willingness to protect investors’ rights is evidenced, in part, by the contents of its foreign investment laws.

At the time of this writing (December 14, 1993), a Draft Project of “Law on Foreign Capital Investment in the Republic of Lithuania” (hereinafter referred to as the “Draft Law”) was under consideration by the Lithuanian parliament.  An examination of the proposed law’s provisions, including its deficiencies, may be of interest to Western investors.

Mr. M. Černiauskas, President of the Association of Lithuanian Chambers of Commerce and Industry, recently contacted Mr. E. Blake Mosher, Chief Executive Officer of Mosher International, Inc., to request Western comments on the Draft Law.  Mr. Mosher subsequently contacted me to offer me the chance to comment upon the Draft Law prior to its being voted upon by the Lithuanian parliament.  At this writing, the Draft Law is still apparently under consideration by the parliament.  The following analysis is based on the comments I submitted to Mr. Černiauskas.

  1. The Draft Law

According to Article 1, the purpose of objective of the Draft Law is to “regulate relations between legal persons registered in the Republic of Lithuania and other foreign states, citizens of other states and stateless persons, making investments of their owned assets in the Republic of Lithuania . . . .”  The law also regulates “relations between the State and foreign investors, as well as foreign capital investments during the whole period of their existence.”

The law is not intended to regulate “the emergence, transformation and termination of ownership and related legal issues between foreign investor (investors) and legal and natural persons of the Republic of Lithuania . . . .”  Nor does the Draft Law “regulate relations between citizens of the Republic of Lithuania and those of foreign states, stateless persons or legal persons of other foreign states, participating in the process of privatization of state property.”

Thus, the main purpose of the Draft Law is to provide a framework governing investments in Lithuania by foreign investors.  This is accomplished by providing what types of investment are permissible (and in which sectors of the economy), and by providing for a licensing system and for investment guarantees.

  • General Considerations–Protection of Private Property Rights

As a general proposition, Lithuania will be successful in attracting foreign capital investments in proportion to foreign investors’ ability to make (and keep) profits by investing there.  Protection of investors’ property rights is essential to this.  The more that private property is protected in Lithuania, the greater an investor’s ability to make more long-range future plans, which increases the chances of success and also increases the amount of profits which can be expected.

Additionally, if an investor’s property rights are well-protected, he is also more likely to be willing to invest in Lithuania in the first place, since he has more confidence that he will be able to keep any profits he earns.  A strong Lithuanian policy of protection of private property will reduce the political risk of doing business in Lithuania, which will increase the amount of profits that can be earned and will decrease the costs of doing business, thereby attracting more investments in Lithuania.

Therefore, the more that property rights are protected, the more investments Lithuania will attract.  Further, Lithuania gives up nothing at all by strengthening investors’ private property rights–except the discretion to expropriate or steal investors’ property.  But Lithuania will have to refrain from such expropriations anyway, in order to have a stable and productive market economy and to become successfully industrialized.  Thus, it is virtually costless to Lithuania to increase the protections afforded to foreign investors–for it gives up nothing more than the right to confiscate investors’ property–and this would benefit Lithuania by making it a more attractive place for investors.

With these general considerations in mind, it is clear that the Draft Law should be revised to strengthen as much as possible the protections offered to foreign investors.  Below I discuss some of the ways in which this might be done.[1]  (The Draft Law is provided in the appendix to this article.)  The foreign investment protections discussed below would be equally beneficial to investors in other developing countries, and even in the West.

  1. Analysis
  2. International Commitment–Concessions and Stabilization Clauses

Although the Draft Law purports to give investors certain protections and property rights, there is nothing that would prevent the Lithuanian government from changing this law.  If an investor must rely upon the existence of the law to be sure that his property rights will be respected, then his property rights will be uncertain to the extent the government is likely and able to simply revise or abolish the law which gives his property protections.  Even if the Draft Law were to state that the government may not pass future laws which violate property rights vested in foreign investors by the current law, in reality a future legislature is always able to change the law.

One way to reduce this problem is to internationalize the protections and promises made by Lithuania concerning the sanctity of investors’ property.  This may be done, for example, through a treaty, by which a state obligates itself and becomes bound under international law.  Although this does not physically prevent the state from breaching the treaty, states are, practically speaking, far more reluctant to breach an international obligation than to merely change one of its own internal laws.

Thus the Bilateral Investment Treaties (“BITs”) entered into between some pairs of nations, such as Russia and the United States, offer strong protections for the property rights of foreign investors.  Lithuania should therefore be urged to enter into BITs with the U.S. and other Western states.

International law also recognizes the ability of a state to bind itself internationally through individual contracts between the state and foreign investors, sometimes known as concessions, and referred to herein as investor-state contracts.  Any investor-state contract should contain an international arbitration clause, which can give jurisdiction to a neutral third party (such as the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, or ICSID), as well as a so-called “stabilization clause.”  A stabilization clause would provide that the law in force in Lithuania at a given date–typically, the time the investor-state contract takes effect–is the law that will supplement the terms of the contract, regardless of future legislation, decrees, or regulations issued by the government.

Therefore, all the protections afforded to investors in the Draft Law should be be internationalized, to help ensure that these protections cannot be arbitrarily overturned by a future legislature.  The Draft Law should include a provision authorizing and requiring the government to issue a form contract or license from the state to the investor, which contains international arbitration and stabilization clauses (to internationalize the license), and which incorporates all the protections embodied in the Draft Law as of the date of issuance of the license.  This would extend the protections embodied in the Draft Law into the license, thereby internationalizing and thus strengthening the private property rights afforded in the Draft Law.

Under this system, any time an investor began to invest in Lithuania, he would automatically receive such a license from Lithuania, containing a solemn contractual guarantee from Lithuania to abide by the promises made in its Draft Law, and to not change the internal laws of Lithuania in a way that would diminish the property rights guaranteed to the investor.  Investors receiving such licenses would be more confident that Lithuania does not intend to expropriate their property or raise taxes to a confiscatory rate.

Investors would also feel that a confiscation of their property would be more unlikely to occur, since this would be a breach of international law by Lithuania, which it would probably be reluctant to do.  This would increase Lithuania’s attractiveness and stability, would reduce political risks faced by investors, and would thus encourage greater investment into Lithuania.

  1. Expropriation of Investors’ Property

Article 6: Foreign Investment Guarantees states that “State authority bodies or governmental bodies shall have no right to encroach upon foreign investments or property of foreign investor.”  This seems to indicate that an investors’ property rights should be respected by the government, which implies that the government will not expropriate or nationalize such property.

However, the next paragraph states “Compensation for the appropriated property shall be paid no later than within three months in invested currency or Lithuanian national currency, if capital of an enterprise was formed by non-monetary (property) contributions, according to the actual market value of the property.”  This sentence appears to contemplate government appropriation (i.e., expropriation or nationalization) of investors’ property.

This apparent inconsistency should be eliminated and the law should be clarified.  If no expropriation of private property by the state is to be allowed, the law should not contemplate that it may occur.  If, on the other hand, expropriation is to be allowed, it should be limited in scope to only narrow situations, since any encroachment upon investors’ property rights will harm Lithuania by making it a less attractive place to invest in.

The Draft Law should be revised to clearly state that the government does not have the right to expropriate an investor’s property, nor even the right of eminent domain.  Since values are subjective, it is impossible to determine an “appropriate” amount of compensation to pay an investor for the “value” of the property which is taken.[2]

However, if it is politically unacceptable to remove the government’s power of eminent domain, which is likely, the Draft Law should at least clearly state that, in the event of an expropriation, the full value of the property should be received, which includes the market value of both lucrum cessans (future profits lost) and damnum emergens (damages).  This “full value” standard will help to protect both the value of the investor’s property, as well as the property itself, since the government is less likely to expropriate property, the more compensation it would have to pay for it.

Additionally, the Draft Law should state that investments shall not be expropriated, directly or indirectly (which includes both indirect and “creeping expropriation”), unless the expropriation is:  (1) for a public purpose; (2) performed in a nondiscriminatory manner; (3) accompanied by payment of prompt, adequate and effective (i.e., full value) compensation; and (4) in accordance with due process of law.

The Draft Law should also provide that any legal expropriation that complies with these international law requirements must be accompanied by full compensation, as discussed above.  Any expropriation not in accordance with these provisions should be deemed an illegal expropriation, and a higher amount of compensation should be awarded–for example, the value of the property taken times three, a treble damages standard often found in anti-trust and other laws.  If treble-damages standards are validly used by governments to deter especially egregious private behaviour, it also makes sense to subject governments themselves to similar penalties, to deter them from breaching fundamental international law.

  1. Natural Resources

Article 13: Foreign Capital Investment which is Prohibited without Concession, provides that exploration and exploitation of state owned natural resources is prohibited without a concession.  As discussed above, any property rights acquired by investors should be protected also through a standard form of license or other form of investor-state contract, which internationalizes Lithuania’s promises to respect investors’ property rights.

Certainly a concession, if it contains international arbitration and stabilization clauses, performs this function.  Therefore, the concession described in this Article should provide, similarly to the suggested license, that the concession will contain international arbitration and stabilization provisions.

  1. Taxation

Article 19: Taxation of Enterprises, should be amended to provide that tax rates shall not be raised higher than the rates in effect at the time the investor began its investment; or, that foreign investors shall never be treated less favorably, i.e., taxed at higher rates, than nationals of Lithuania; or both.  The Article should provide that any prohibited increase in taxes includes both direct and indirect tax increases–including the effects of inflation, since price inflation is caused by government expansion of the money supply and is economically equivalent to a tax.

If these guarantees were fortified by the internationalized, routinely-granted license suggested in this paper, investors would be more confident that the taxes in effect currently would not increase and eat away at their profits.  This certainty of the ability to earn and retain profits would be an additional incentive for investors to invest in Lithuania.

Moreover, if Lithuania is able to do so, it should eliminate all tariffs and taxes of whatever kind, except perhaps for a modest amount of sales taxes, which could be imposed on foreign investors, with this regime backed by an internationalized promise as discussed above.  Lithuania could become a tax haven and the resulting rush of investors to invest in Lithuania could transform its economy virtually overnight.  There is nothing preventing Lithuania, or any other country, for that matter, from doing this, other than anti-capitalistic inertia and ideology.

Article 20: Tax Reliefs and Tariffs, provides for income tax reductions for five and three year periods.  These periods should be extended as much as politically feasible, and the percentage reductions on tax rates should be increased as much as politically feasible.

Article 20 also provides that, if an enterprise is voluntarily liquidated during the time when these tax reliefs are in force, or within three years thereafter, the investor must disgorge the “saved” tax reliefs that they received.  This provision is one of the worst provisions in the Draft Law.  It should definitely be abolished.

It is wrong to think that an enterprise can be made to be profitable by force, threats, or coercion, which is what this law amounts to.  This law provides a perverse incentive for companies investing in speculative or risky enterprises to avoid investing in Lithuania, for it effectively increases the potential losses the investor may face.  In order to be successful, businesses must also be allowed to fail when market conditions so dictate.  If firms’ ability to fail is removed, so is the ability to succeed–just as an individual can only be moral if he is free to choose both the right and wrong course of action.  (This parallel between moral flourishing and flourishing in the market is no coincidence, for the free market, a liberal order under which individuals are free and treated as sovereigns, is the moral economic system.)

  1. Leases on State-Owned Land

Article 14: The Right of Enterprises to Use Land Plots and Real Property provides that State-owned land may be leased for enterprise for up to 99 years.  This provision should be amended to allow or even require the government to internationalize any such lease, i.e., to include international arbitration and stabilization clauses in the lease contract to ensure that rights granted to investors-lessees are protected as fully as possible.

  1. Reduce Regulations on Acquisitions of Shares

Article 9: The Right of Acquisition of Shares of Enterprises and Credit Companies requires that foreign investors must procure the consent of the Bank of Lithuania in order to acquire up to 20%, 33%, or 50% of the shares of credit companies.  Such regulations are unnecessarily burdensome and costly for investors, and tend to increase the cost of business and thus reduce the incentive for investment in Lithuania.

Such regulations also presume that the investor has in improper purpose, and are thus a form of “prior restraint.”  However, for law-abiding investors, it should be presumed that the investor has no improper purpose and is attempting to legally and properly make profits by creating wealth.  The requirement to obtain the Bank of Lithuania’s consent before acquiring varying percentages of shares in credit companies should be deleted or diluted as much as politically feasible.

  1. Legal Monopolies and Other Monopolies

Article 10: License to Make a Foreign Investment or to Participate in Certain Types of Activity requires an investor to obtain a license when investing in certain enterprises holding a monopoly in the Lithuanian market.  While a legal monopoly, such as the government’s monopoly over the printing of money or the building of roads, is a true monopoly, the concept of a non-legal monopoly has always been a problematic one, and legal systems would be well-served to abolish this concept.[3]

Typically, “monopoly power” is attributed to any successful company that prospers and grows because it is innovative, efficient, and satisfies its customers’ demands.  Thus to punish firms for being “monopolies” is to punish success and flourishing.  Rather, Lithuania needs to encourage success in order to build a healthy, robust economy.  Therefore Article 10 should be amended to require a license only for investments in legal monopolies, if at all.

  1. Prohibited Investments

Article 12: Investment Object wherein Foreign Capital Investment is Prohibited prohibits foreign investments in certain sectors of the economy.  Some of these are defensible on sovereignty or national security or defense grounds, such as illegal narcotics and weapons.  However, items 5-9–manufacturing of alcoholic beverages; securities, banknotes, coins, and stamps; treating of certain dangerous illnesses; treating animals with certain diseases; and gambling activities–are unduly restrictive.

Each of these activities, as long as they are legal, could benefit from the increased capital, know-how, technology, and competition which would result from allowing foreign investors to invest in these areas.  For example, if wine or beer can be made more cheaply or more efficiently or in greater variety due to foreign capital or control, there is no reason to deny Lithuanian citizens the benefits of having greater options to choose from.  As the successful history of privatization shows, private enterprises can efficiently perform activities historically monopolized by governments, such as minting of coins.  Items 5-9 should therefore be deleted from the list of prohibited investments.

  1. Presumption of Permissiveness of Actions

In the original American constitutional system, it was presumed that all actions by individuals were permissible unless expressly prohibited by government.  This is a general presumption of individual liberty, and it is necessary for any successful society and economy.  The opposite system that has been implemented in certain countries holds that only actions which are expressly permitted by the government are allowed, while anything else is prohibited.  It is essential for businesses that the former system be in place, rather than the latter.

To that end, the Draft Law should contain a provision which provides that, in cases of doubt or ambiguity, or where the Draft Law or other laws are silent, it is presumed that any investment-related activity of a foreign investor is permissible and legal.  Thus, investors would be free to engage in actions not prohibited by the Draft Law.  This would increase the certainty of the legality of options open to investors, and would hence broaden their range of legal options, which increases investors’ chances at making profits.  This, in turn, increases Lithuania’s attractiveness as a host country for investment.

  1. Contract Rights as Property Rights

Often it is unclear whether contractual rights are property rights or something related, but different.  Because contract rights–for example, accounts receivable–are assets as important to many companies as tangible property like land and buildings, the Draft Law should clearly provide that “property” and “property rights” includes all sorts of rights, including immovables such as land, movables such as office equipment, corporeals and incorporeals, intellectual property rights, and contract rights, all of which are equally protected private property rights.

  1. Conclusion

One of the problems the emerging economies of Eastern Europe face is that too much attention is being paid to the advice of Western governments.  Western governments are facing their own problems now, primarily because of too much government interference and regulation in the free market, which, ultimately, is the only creator of wealth.

Eastern Europe should be wary of accepting the advice of Western governments to tax and regulate the market, adopting our IRS, SEC, and anti-trust laws.  The soundest critique of Western economic problems has been that explaining why government intervention and the erosion of individual rights, including property rights, has resulted in our recessions and stagnation.

If Eastern Europe’s nations would learn from the West’s successes–which were built on free enterprise and private property–but also from our mistakes–i.e., too much government–they could be well on their way to economic prosperity.  The private property-oriented suggestions offered herein can help lead Lithuania towards this goal.

APPENDIX

DRAFT PROJECT:

LAW ON FOREIGN CAPITAL INVESTMENT IN THE REPUBLIC OF LITHUANIA

Chapter 1

GENERAL PROVISIONS

  • Article Objective of the Law

This Law shall regulate relations between legal persons registered in the Republic of Lithuania and other foreign states, citizens of other states and stateless persons, making investments of their owned assets in the Republic of Lithuania, as well as relations between the State and foreign investors, as well as foreign capital investments during the whole period of their existence.

The Law shall not regulate the emergence, transformation and termination of ownership and related legal issues between foreign investor (investors) and legal and natural persons of the Republic of Lithuania, with the exception of cases established by this Law.

The provisions of this Law shall not regulate relations between citizens of the Republic of Lithuania and those of foreign states, stateless persons or legal persons of other foreign states, participating in the process of privatization of state property.

  • Article Definitions

Definitions as used in this Law.

“Objects of Investment” – production, trade, services.

“Entities of Investment” – legal persons, registered in foreign states, who make investments of foreign capital in the Republic of Lithuania, as well as citizens of other states and stateless persons, permanently residing abroad at the moment of making foreign capital investment.

“Foreign Investor (Investors)” – an investment entity whichever pursuant to the procedure established by laws has invested its owned assets in the Republic of Lithuania.

“Foreign Capital” – to an investment entity by the right of ownership, the following assets belonging:

  • convertible currency;
  • evaluated in convertible or Lithuanian national currency:
    1. real estate (buildings, constructions, premises and other real estate), located in the Republic of Lithuania or in other foreign states;
    2. industrial or intellectual property;
    3. movable property;

used to form or increase authorized capital.

“Foreign Capital Investment” – single legal action by which an investment entity puts its owned capital in the Republic of Lithuania.

“Foreign Capital Investments” – investment of investor’s capital in production, trade, services provided.

“Enterprise” – a newly established, reorganized or operating enterprise whereto a foreign capital is invested.

“Enterprise Controlled by Foreign Investor (Investors)”:

-upon the establishment, reorganization or participation in the operating enterprise the newly emerged right for a foreign investor (investors) to determine character or type of activity of an enterprise or to manage it (by a direct control right);

-by the establishment agreement of an enterprise and bylaws or acts of management bodies of an enterprise the granted right to a representative or representatives of an investor (investors) to determine character and type of activity of an enterprise or to manage it (by indirect control right).

“Investment Dispute” – a dispute between a foreign investor (investors) and the Republic of Lithuania on the amount of compensation for the appropriated property order and conditions of payment.

“Concession” – the compensation agreement for the permission to exploit state owned resources for a period defined in the agreement.

“National Regime” – legal environment whereat legal persons registered in foreign states, citizens of other states and stateless persons at the moment of making investments and within the period of existence of the investment enjoy the very same rights and have the very same responsibilities equal to those of legal and natural persons of the Republic of Lithuania, with the exceptions of cases established by this Law.

Chapter 2

FOREIGN CAPITAL INVESTMENT

  • Article Forms of Foreign Capital Investment

Investment entities shall enjoy a right, without any restrictions, with the exception of cases established in Article 10 of this Law, to invest their owned capital in the Republic of Lithuania by the following forms:

  • establishing an enterprise;
  • acquiring securities of operating enterprises;
  • establishing a commercial bank or acquiring shares in operating banks.

Legal persons, registered in foreign states, are entitled to open their mission in the Republic of Lithuania, which is not a legal person and may not be involved in economic-commercial activity.

Legal persons, registered in foreign states, are entitled to establish their branches, as well as establish subsidiaries or manage them.

  • Article National Regime

National Regime shall be applied to investment entities that invest their capital in the Republic of Lithuania.

Investment entities are considered foreign investors from the moment of establishment (registration) of an enterprise or acquiring shares of stock or bonds.

  • Article Amount of Foreign Capital Investment

Amount of foreign capital investment shall have to be not bellow than one thousand USD or equivalent in other convertible currencies, with the exception of cases set forth by Article 3 of paragraph 1, 2 and 3 subparagraphs.

  • Article Foreign Investment Guarantees

Foreign investments, investor’s profit, income, rights and legal interests in the Republic of Lithuania shall be protected by the State of Lithuania.

State authority bodies or governmental bodies shall have no right to encroach upon foreign investments or property of foreign investor.

Compensation for the appropriated property shall be paid no later than within three months in invested currency or Lithuanian national currency, if capital of an enterprise was formed by non-monetary (property) contributions, according to the actual market value of the property.

Compensation, received for the appropriated property, at the request of investors (investor) shall be transferred abroad without any restrictions.

Foreign investor (investors) in cases of investment disputes shall be entitled to apply directly to the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (I.C.S.I.D.), with reference to Convention “On Investment Disputes between Countries and Citizens of Other States” norms, adopted in Washington 18 March, 1965.

  • Article Establishment, Operation and Liquidation of an Enterprise

The procedure of establishment, operation and liquidation of enterprises and their legal status shall be defined according to the law of that type of enterprise.

Enterprises shall be registered by the procedure established by the authorized governmental body.

The procedure of establishment of a commercial bank with foreign or mixed capital shall be defined by the “Law on Commercial (Stock) Banks of the Republic of Lithuania”.

  • Article Formation of Capital of Enterprise

The owned assets of an enterprise shall be formed by monetary and non-monetary (property) contributions, as well as industrial and intellectual property.

Foreign investor shall have to make monetary contribution to the formed owned capital of an enterprise in hard (convertible) currency or in Lithuanian national currency in the manner established by the Government of the Republic of Lithuania.

Upon the agreement of parties, non-monetary (property) or industrial and intellectual property contributions shall be evaluated in convertible currency or Lithuanian national currency.

  • Article The Right of Acquisition of Shares of Enterprises and Credit Companies

Investment entity is entitled, without any restrictions, to acquire shares of enterprises and credit companies in all property forms, with the exception of cases set forth in this Article.

Investment entity may acquire only registered shares of state and state stock enterprises.

To acquire shares of state and state stock enterprises of specific destination investment entity may only by obtaining license to make a foreign capital investment by order established in Article 11 of this Law.

To acquire, increase (decrease) the amount of shares of credit companies up to 20%, 33% or 50% of a fixed capital of a bank a prior consent of Bank of Lithuania should be received.

Investment entity may acquire shares of enterprises or credit companies of all types of property for hard (convertible) currency or Lithuanian national currency.

  • Article License to Make a Foreign Investment or to Participate in Certain Types of Activity

Investment entity shall receive a license to make a foreign investment when:

  • investing in state and state stock enterprises of special destination, the list of which shall be approved by the Government of the Republic of Lithuania;
  • investing in an enterprise, holding a monopoly in the Lithuanian market or may gain a monopoly from the moment of making foreign capital investment.
  • Article The Procedure of Issuing a License to Make a Foreign Capital Investment

A license to make a foreign capital investment in cases set forth by Article 10 of this Law shall be issued by the Government of the Republic of Lithuania or its authorized body.

Foreign capital investment shall be made no later than six months from the date of the receipt of the license.

If the capital of an enterprise is not formed within the fixed period, the license shall be revoked.

Chapter 3

INVESTMENT OBJECTS WHEREIN FOREIGN INVESTMENT IS PROHIBITED OR LIMITED

  • Article Investment Object wherein Foreign Capital Investment is Prohibited

Foreign capital investments are prohibited in objects engaged in:

  • economic-commercial activity, related to the security and national defence of the Republic of Lithuania;
  • manufacturing narcotics, narcotic, harmful or poisonous substances;
  • growing, manufacturing and selling cultures, containing narcotic, harmful or poisonous substances;
  • manufacturing and selling weapons and explosives;
  • manufacturing vodka, wine, liqueurs and other alcoholic beverages;
  • manufacturing securities, banknotes and coins, and post stamps;
  • treating persons ill with dangerous and especially dangerous diseases, including venereal diseases and infections, skin diseases and aggressive forms of psychic diseases;
  • treating animals with especially dangerous diseases;
  • establishing or operating gambling houses, organizing games of chances or holding lotteries.
  • Article Foreign Capital Investment which is Prohibited without Concession

Exploration and exploiting of state owned natural resources is prohibited without a concession.

  • Article Activity of Enterprises, Controlled by Foreign Investor (Investors)

Enterprises, controlled by foreign investor (investors) shall be prohibited from:

  • operating state owned highways, railways, seaports, airports according to their functional purpose, these objects being of national significance;
  • operating oil and gas pipelines, communications, electric power transmission lines, heating systems, and ensuring technical functioning of these objects.

Chapter 4

THE PROCEDURE OF THE ACTIVITY OF ENTERPRISES

  • Article The Right of Enterprises to Use Land Plots and Real Property

Enterprises shall have the right to own or rent buildings and premises necessary for their commercial-economic activity, as well as to rent plots of land for the construction of said buildings accordingly to laws of the Republic of Lithuania.

State owned land may be leased for enterprise for up to 99 years, with a right of priority for extension of the lease.

Private land shall be rented according to the agreement of parties.

  • Article Accounts of Enterprises

Balance sheet and statistical accounting prescribed by laws of the Republic of Lithuania shall be applied to enterprises.

  • Article Interrelations between Enterprises and Financial and Control Bodies

Control over conformity of the business conducted by enterprises with the laws of the Republic of Lithuania shall be exercised by the bodies of State Control and financial bodies of the Republic of Lithuania.

Upon the demand of the bodies of State Control or financial bodies of the Republic of Lithuania, said enterprises must, within the limits established by the laws of the Republic of Lithuania, submit the necessary information on their activities for review.

  • Article The Responsibility of State Control Bodies and Officers

The control body must ensure the confidentiality of commercial secrets of enterprises reviewed.

The content of a commercial secret is established by the law.

The control body must compensate enterprise for losses incurred.

Losses are completely compensated from the state budget, if the control body proves it obtains no sufficient means to compensate the enterprise for the losses incurred.  The procedure and conditions for compensating losses from the state budget is established by the law.

Officers, having revealed commercial secrets of the reviewed enterprise, shall be prosecuted.

Chapter 5

TAXES AND TAX RELIEFS

  • Article Taxation of Enterprises

The procedure of taxation of enterprises shall be established by the Tax Law of the Republic of Lithuania.

  • Article Tax Reliefs and Tariffs

If an enterprise is registered in the Republic of Lithuania, profit (income) tax levied on the share of enterprise’s profit or income (proportionate to the share of foreign capital in the owned capital of the enterprise), and also reinvested in the production, shall be reduced by 70% for a 5 year period.  On the expiry of the period, profit (income) tax levied on the share of the profit (income) due to the foreign investment shall be reduced by 50% for a 3 year period.

The tax reliefs indicated in the first point of this Article shall be applied from the moment of the receipt of profit.

Other tax reliefs shall be applied according to tax laws and other laws of the Republic of Lithuania.

If an enterprise is liquidated by the consent of founders during the time when tax reliefs are valid or within 3 years since the expiration of tax relief term, it must pay the difference between profit tax and profit tax reliefs when they were valid.

Alternative of Article 20

Profit and income of enterprises, registered in the Republic of Lithuania, is taxable in general manner.

  • Article Responsibility for Violating Tax Law

Penalties, established in the laws of the Republic of Lithuania, for violating of tax laws shall be applied to enterprises.

  • Article Disposition of Profit or Dividends, Derived from Foreign Capital Investment

Dividends, profit or a portion of a profit in hard currency of a foreign investor (investors) shall be repatriated or transferred abroad without any restrictions.

Foreign investors may also transfer all or a portion of their profit, dividends in form of products or services acquired on the Lithuanian domestic market, or reinvest said income in the economy of the Republic of Lithuania.

  • Article Customs Reliefs

Contributions of foreign investors to the owned capital during the period of formation or increasing thereof shall be exempt from custom duties.

If an enterprise is liquidated by the decision of founders, assets or part of property repatriated of foreign investors and property acquired by foreign investors for profit or dividends shall be exempt from customs duties.

Chapter 6

FINAL PROVISIONS

If an international agreement sets other conditions of making a foreign capital investment or existence of the investment than this Law, in that case an international agreement shall be prevailing.

COMMENTS

To ensure effective functioning of this Law, it is necessary to make complex amendments in laws related to the establishment and activity of economic entities.  For example, the following amendments shall be made in “Law on Enterprises of the Republic of Lithuania”, as well as in other laws:

-to separate a branch from a legal person;

-to clearly define features of subsidiaries;

-to provide a right to establish an enterprise (legal person) for one founder;

-to draft and adopt a law, in which opportunity to form capital of an enterprise on the basis of general partial property of founders would be determined.

***      Insurance of Enterprises

The property of enterprises in the Republic of Lithuania must be insured by state or private insurance agencies, regardless of whether same is insured in other localities.

******            The Procedure of Conducting Financial Operations of Enterprises

Financial operations of enterprises shall be conducted through banks registered in the Republic of Lithuania.  Enterprises may open bank accounts in other states as well.

References

[1].  For further discussion of some of the methods for reducing political risk, and related international law issues, discussed in these comments, see the following articles by Paul E. Comeaux and myself:  Reducing the Political Risk of Investing in Russia and Other C.I.S. Republics:  International Arbitration and Stabilization Clauses, Russian Oil & Gas Guide p. 21 (Vol. 2, No. 2, April 1993); United States Bilateral Investment Treaties with Russia and Other C.I.S. Republics, Russian Oil & Gas Guide p. 23 (Vol. 2, No. 3, July 1993); Insurance for U.S. Investments in Russia and Other C.I.S. Republics:  MIGA and OPIC, Russian Oil & Gas Guide p. 3 (Vol. 2, No. 4, October 1993); and Political Risk and Petroleum Investment in Russia, Currents, International Trade Law Journal Summer 1993, at 48.

[2].  The views of the Austrian school of economics on the subjective nature of value are extremely insightful.  For a classic treatment, see Ludwig von Mises, Human Action:  A Treatise on Economics (3d. ed. 1966) (1949).  See also the further Austrian economics insights contained in Murray N. Rothbard, Man, Economy, and State:  A Treatise on Economic Principles (1962) (two volumes) and Hans-Hermann Hoppe, A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism:  Economics, Politics, and Ethics (1989).  For a forthcoming detailed review of Hoppe’s latest book, see my article The Undeniable Morality of Capitalism, 25 St. Mary’s Law Journal ___ (Vol. 25, No. 4, June 1994) (review essay of Hans-Hermann Hoppe, The Economics and Ethics of Private Property (1993)).  To obtain these books, contact the Ludwig von Mises Institute (Auburn University, Auburn, Alabama, 36849, telephone 205/844-2500).

[3]See Rothbard, supra note , at 604-15, discussing “The Illusion of Monopoly Price on the Unhampered Market.”  See also Chapter 1 of Hoppe, supra note , “Fallacies of the Public Goods Theory and the Production of Security.”

Comments on Draft Project of “Law on Foreign Capital Investment in the Republic of Lithuania, Memorandum to Mr. M. Černiauskas, President, Association of Lithuanian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (November 18 1993).

  1. Stephan Kinsella

 

713/752-4360

 

November 18, 1993

 

 

Association of Lithuanian Chambers of Commerce and Industry

Attn:  Mr. M. Černiauskas, President

Re: Comments on Draft Project of “Law on Foreign Capital Investment in the Republic of Lithuania”

Dear Mr. Černiauskas:

Mr. E. Blake Mosher, Chief Executive Officer of Mosher International, Inc., recently informed me of your Draft Project of “Law on Foreign Capital Investment in the Republic of Lithuania,” and of your desire to receive comments on the draft.  This letter contains my comments on the draft laws.  Please be aware that the comments that follow are my own opinion and do not necessarily represent the views of Jackson & Walker, L.L.P., my employer.

*     *     *

Comments on the Draft Project of “Law on Foreign Capital Investment in the Republic of Lithuania”:  A Free Market Perspective

  1. General Considerations—Protection of Private Property Rights………… 2
  2. Specific Suggestions………………………………………. 2
  3. International Commitment—Concessions and Stabilization Clauses……… 2
  4. Expropriation of Investors’ Property…………………………………………………… 3
  5. Natural Resources…………………………………………….. 4
  6. Taxation… 5
  7. Leases on State-Owned Land…………………………………………. 5
  8. Reduce Regulations on Acquisitions of Shares…… 6
  9. Legal Monopolies and Other Monopolies………….. 6
  10. Prohibited Investments………………….. 6
  11. Presumption of Permissiveness of Actions……………………… 7
  12. Contract Rights as Property Rights…………………………………… 7

III.  Conclusion………………………………………….   7

1)  General Considerations—Protection of Private Property Rights

As a general proposition, Lithuania will be successful in attracting foreign capital investments in proportion to foreign investors’ ability and chances at making profits in Lithuania.  The more that private property is protected under Lithuania’s policies, the greater an investor’s ability to make more long-range future plans, which increases the chances of success and also increases the amount of profits which can be expected.  Additionally, if an investor’s property rights are well-protected, he is also more likely to be willing to invest in Lithuania in the first place, since he has more confidence that any profits he earns, he will be able to keep.  Finally, a strong Lithuanian policy of protection of private property will reduce the political risk of doing business in Lithuania, which also will increase the amount of profits that can be earned and will decrease the costs of doing business, thereby attracting more investments in Lithuania.

As discussed above, the more that property rights are protected, the more investments Lithuania will attract.  Further, Lithuania gives up nothing at all by strengthening investors’ private property rights, except the discretion to expropriate investors’ property.  However, in order to become successfully industrialized, Lithuania will have to refrain from such expropriations anyway, in order to have a stable and productive market economy.  Thus, it is virtually costless to Lithuania to increase the protections afforded to foreign investors, and this would benefit Lithuania by making it a more attractive place for investors.

With these general considerations in mind, I feel that the Draft Project of “Law on Foreign Capital Investment in the Republic of Lithuania” (hereinafter referred to as the “Draft Law”) should be modified to strengthen as much as possible the protections offered to foreign investors.  Below I offer my suggestions as to some of the ways in which this might be done.

3)  Specific Suggestions

  1. a) International Commitment—Concessions and Stabilization Clauses

Although the Draft Law purports to give investors certain protections and property rights, there is nothing which would prevent the Lithuanian government from changing this law.  If an investor must rely upon the existence of the law to be sure that his property rights will be respected, then his property rights will be uncertain to the extent the government is likely and able to simply revise or abolish the law which gives his property protections.  Even if the Draft Law were to state that the government may not pass future laws which violate property rights vested in foreign investors by the current law, the concept of “legislative sovereignty” means that a future legislature is always able to change the law.

One way to resolve this problem is to internationalize the protections and promises made by Lithuania concerning the sanctity of investors’ property.  One way to do this is through a treaty, by which a state obligates itself and becomes bound under international law.  Although this does not physically prevent the state from breaching the treaty, states are far more reluctant to breach an international obligation than to merely change one of its own internal laws.  Thus the Bilateral Investment Treaties (“BITs”) entered into between some pairs of nations, such as Russia and the United States, offer strong protections for the property rights of foreign investors.  I would therefore recommend that Lithuania enter into BITs with the U.S. and other Western states.

 

International law also recognizes the ability of a state to bind itself internationally through individual contracts between the state and foreign investors, sometimes known as concessions, and referred to herein as investor-state contracts.  Any such investor-state contract should contain an international arbitration clause, which can give jurisdiction to a neutral third party, as well as a so-called “stabilization clause.”  The stabilization clause would provide that the law in force in the Lithuania at a given date—typically, the time the investor-state contract takes effect—is the law that will supplement the terms of the contract, regardless of future legislation, decrees, or regulations issued by the government.

 

Therefore I recommend that all the protections afforded to investors in the Draft Law be internationalized.  The Draft Law should include a provision authorizing and requiring the government to issue a form contract or license from the state to the investor, which contains international arbitration and stabilization clauses, and which incorporates all the protections embodied in the Draft Law as of the date of issuance of the license.  This would do no more than to extend the protections embodied in the Draft Law into the license, thereby internationalizing and thus strengthening the private property rights afforded in the Draft Law.

Any time an investor began to invest in Lithuania, he would automatically receive such a license from Lithuania, containing a solemn contractual guarantee from Lithuania to abide by the promises made in its Draft Law, and to not change the internal laws of Lithuania in a way that would diminish the property rights guaranteed to him.  Investors receiving such licenses would be more confident that Lithuania does not intend to expropriate their property or raise taxes to a confiscatory rate.  This would increase Lithuania’s attractiveness and stability, would reduce political risks faced by investors, and would thus encourage greater investment into Lithuania.

 

  1. c) Expropriation of Investors’ Property

 

Article 6: Foreign Investment Guarantees states that “State authority bodies or governmental bodies shall have no right to encroach upon foreign investments or property of foreign investor.”  This seems to indicate that an investors’ property rights should be respected by the government, which implies that the government will not expropriate or nationalize such property.  However, the next paragraph states “Compensation for the appropriated property shall be paid no later than within three months in invested currency or Lithuanian national currency, if capital of an enterprise was formed by non-monetary (property) contributions, according to the actual market value of the property.”  This sentence appears to contemplate government appropriation (i.e., expropriation or nationalization) of investors’ property.

 

My first comment in this regard is that this apparent inconsistency should be eliminated and the law clarified.  If no expropriation of private property by the state is to be allowed, the law should not contemplate that it may occur.  If, on the other hand, expropriation is to be allowed, it should be limited in scope to only narrow situations.

 

I would recommend clearly stating that the government does not have the right to expropriate an investor’s property, nor the right of eminent domain.  Since values are subjective, it is impossible to determine an “appropriate” amount of compensation to pay an investor for the “value” of the property which is taken.  However, if it is politically unacceptable to remove the government’s power of eminent domain, which is likely, the Draft Law should clearly state that, in the event of an expropriation, the full value of the property should be received, which includes the market value of both lucrum cessans (future profits lost) and damnum emergens (damages).  This “full value” standard will help to protect both the value of the investor’s property, as well as the property itself, since the government is less likely to expropriate property the more compensation it would have to pay for it.

 

Additionally, the Draft Law should state that investments shall not be expropriated, directly or indirectly (which includes both indirect and “creeping expropriation”), unless:  (1) for a public purpose; (2) performed in a nondiscriminatory manner; (3) upon payment of prompt, adequate and effective (i.e., full value) compensation; and (4) in accordance with due process of law.  The law should provide that any legal expropriation that complies with these international law requirements must be accompanied by full compensation, as discussed above; any expropriation not in accordance with these provisions should be deemed an illegal expropriation, and a higher amount of compensation should be awarded—for example, the value of the property take times three, a treble damages standard often found in anti-trust and other laws.

 

  1. e) Natural Resources

 

Article 13: Foreign Capital Investment which is Prohibited without Concession, provides that exploration and exploitation of state owned natural resources is prohibited without a concession.  As discussed in Part 0, above, any property rights acquired by investors should be protected also through a standard form of license or other form of investor-state contract, which internationalizes Lithuania’s promises to respect investors’ property rights.  Certainly a concession, if it contains international arbitration and stabilization clauses, performs this function.  Therefore, the concession described in this Article should provide, similarly to the license I suggest in Part 0, above, that the concession will contain international arbitration and stabilization provisions.

 

  1. g) Taxation

 

Article 19: Taxation of Enterprises, should be amended to provide that tax rates shall not be raised higher than the rates in effect at the time the investor began its investment; or, that foreign investors shall never be treated less favorably, i.e., taxed at higher rates, than nationals of Lithuania; or both.  The Article should provide that any prohibited increase in taxes includes both direct and indirect tax increases, including the effects of inflation, which is caused by government expansion of the money supply and is economically equivalent to a tax.  If these guarantees were fortified by the internationalized, routinely-granted license I suggest in Part 0, above, investors would be more confident that the taxes in effect currently would not increase and eat away at their profits.  This certainty of the ability to earn and retain profits would be an additional incentive for investors to invest in Lithuania.

 

Moreover, if Lithuania is able to do so, it should eliminate all tariffs and taxes of whatever kind, except perhaps for a modest amount of sales taxes, which could be imposed on foreign investors, with this situation backed by an internationalized promise as discussed above.  Lithuania could become a tax haven and the resulting rush of investors to invest in Lithuania could transform its economy virtually overnight.

 

Alternatively, Article 20: Tax Reliefs and Tariffs, provides for income tax reductions for five and three year periods.  These periods should be extended as much as politically feasible, and the percentage reductions on tax rates should be increased as much as politically feasible.

 

Article 20 also provides that, if an enterprise is voluntarily liquidated during the time when these tax reliefs are in force, or within three years thereafter, the investor must disgorge the “saved” tax reliefs that they received.  This provision is one of the worst provisions in the Draft Law.  It should definitely be abolished.  It is wrong to think that an enterprise can be made to be profitable by force, threats, or coercion, which is what this law amounts to.  This law provides a perverse incentive for companies investing in speculative or risky enterprises to avoid investing in Lithuania, for it effectively increases the potential losses the investor may face.  In order to have successful businesses, businesses must also be allowed to fail when market conditions so dictate.  If firms’ ability to fail is removed, so is the ability to succeed—just as an individual can only be moral if he is free to choose both the right and wrong course of action.

 

  1. i) Leases on State-Owned Land

 

Article 14: The Right of Enterprises to Use Land Plots and Real Property provides that State owned land may be leased for enterprise for up to 99 years.  This provision should be amended to allow or even require the government to internationalize any such lease, i.e., to include international arbitration and stabilization clauses in the lease contract to ensure that rights granted to investors-lessees are protected as fully as possible.

 

  1. k) Reduce Regulations on Acquisitions of Shares

 

Article 9: The Right of Acquisition of Shares of Enterprises and Credit Companies requires that foreign investors must procure the consent of the Bank of Lithuania in order to acquire up to 20%, 33%, or 50% of the shares of credit companies.  Such regulations are unnecessarily burdensome and costly for investors, and tend to increase the cost of business and thus reduce the incentive for investment in Lithuania.  Such regulations also presume that the investor has in improper purpose.  However, for law-abiding investors, it should be presumed that the investor has no improper purpose and is attempting to legally and properly make a profit by creating wealth.  The requirement to obtain the Bank of Lithuania’s consent before acquiring varying percentages of shares in credit companies should be deleted or at least diluted or ameliorated.

 

  1. m) Legal Monopolies and Other Monopolies

 

Article 10: License to Make a Foreign Investment or to Participate in Certain Types of Activity requires an investor to obtain a license when investing in certain enterprises holding a monopoly in the Lithuanian market.  While a legal monopoly, such as the government’s monopoly over the printing of money or the building of roads, is a true monopoly, the concept of a non-legal monopoly has always been a problematic one, and legal systems would be well-served to abolish this concept.  Typically “monopoly power” is attributed to any successful company that prospers and grows because it is innovative, efficient, and satisfies its customers’ demands.  Thus to punish firms for being “monopolies” is to punish success and flourishing, which is exactly what Lithuania needs to encourage in order to build a healthy, robust economy.  Therefore Article 10 should be amended to require a license only for investments in legal monopolies.

 

  1. o) Prohibited Investments

 

Article 12: Investment Object wherein Foreign Capital Investment is Prohibited prohibits foreign investments in certain sectors of the economy.  Some of these are defensible on sovereignty or national security or defense grounds, such as illegal narcotics and weapons.  However, items 5-9—manufacturing of alcoholic beverages; securities, banknotes, coins, and stamps; treating of certain dangerous illnesses; treating animals with certain diseases; and gambling activities—are unduly restrictive.  Each of these activities, as long as they are legal, could benefit from the increased capital, know-how, technology, and competition which would result from allowing foreign investors to invest in these areas.  For example, if wine or beer can be made more cheaply or more efficiently or in greater variety due to foreign capital or control, there is no reason to deny Lithuanian citizens the benefits of having greater options to choose from.  As the successful history of privatization shows, private enterprises can efficiently perform activities traditionally relegated to government’s purview, such as minting of coins.  Items 5-9 should therefore be deleted from the list of prohibited investments.

 

  1. q) Presumption of Permissiveness of Actions

 

In the original American constitutional system, it was presumed that all actions by individuals were permissible unless expressly prohibited by government.  This is a general presumption of individual liberty.  The opposite system which has been implemented in certain countries is that only actions which are expressly permitted by the government are allowed, while anything else is prohibited.  It is essential for businesses that the former system be in place, rather than the latter.

 

To that end, the Draft Law should contain a provision which provides that, in cases of doubt or ambiguity, or where the Draft Law or other laws are silent, it is presumed that any investment-related activity of a foreign investor is permissible and legal.  Thus, investors would be free to engage in actions not prohibited by the Draft Law.  This would increase the certainty of the legality of options open to investors, and would hence broaden their range of legal options, which increases investors’ ability and chance of making profit.  This, in turn, increases Lithuania’s attractiveness as a host country for investment.

 

  1. s) Contract Rights as Property Rights

 

Often it is unclear whether contractual rights are property rights or something related, but different.  Because contract rights—for example, accounts receivable—are assets as important to many companies as tangible property like land and buildings, the Draft Law should clearly provide that “property” and “property rights” includes all sorts of rights, including immovables such as land, movables such as office equipment, corporeals and incorporeals, intellectual property rights, and contract rights, all of which are equally protected private property rights.

 

 

5)  Conclusion

 

In my opinion one of the problems the emerging economies of Eastern Europe face is that too much attention is being paid to the advice of Western governments.  Western governments are facing their own problems now, primarily because of too much government interference and regulation in the free market, which, ultimately, is the only creator of wealth.  Eastern Europe should be wary of accepting the advice of Western governments to tax and regulate the market, adopting our IRS, SEC, and anti-trust laws.  The soundest critique of Western economic problems has been that explaining why government intervention and the erosion of property rights has resulted in our recessions and stagnation.  If Eastern Europe’s nations would learn from the West’s successes—which were built on free enterprise and private property—but also from our mistakes—i.e., too much government—they could be well on their way to economic prosperity.  The private property-oriented suggestions offered herein can help lead Lithuania towards this goal.

 

*     *     *

 

Enclosed with this letter are the following articles which you may find of interest and which discuss in detail many of the suggestions made above, written by myself and Mr. Paul E. Comeaux, who also works here at Jackson & Walker in our International Law Practice Group:

 

  • Reducing the Political Risk of Investing in Russia and Other C.I.S. Republics: International Arbitration and Stabilization Clauses, Russian Oil & Gas Guide p. 21 (Vol. 2, No. 2, April 1993);

 

  • Political Risk and Petroleum Investment in Russia, Currents, International Trade Law Journal Summer 1993, at 48;

 

  • United States Bilateral Investment Treaties with Russia and Other C.I.S. Republics, Russian Oil & Gas Guide p. 23 (Vol. 2, No. 3, July 1993); and

 

  • Insurance for U.S. Investments in Russia and Other C.I.S. Republics: MIGA and OPIC, Russian Oil & Gas Guide p. 3 (Vol. 2, No. 4, October 1993).

 

Also enclosed is an article you may find useful written by Mr. J. Lanier Yeates, a partner in Jackson & Walker’s Energy Section and the Head of our International Law Practice Group, and by Gary B. Conine, Professor of Law at the University of Houston Law Center:  Russian Petroleum Legislation:  Assessing the New Legal Framework, Russian Oil & Gas Guide p. 3 (Vol. 2, No. 1, January 1993).  I have also enclosed with this letter copies of recent issues of our firm’s International Law Practice Group Newsletter, each of which also contain a brief description of our firm’s international law practice.

 

If you have any questions or if I can be of further assistance, please do not hesitate to write or call me.

 

 

Very truly yours,

N. Stephan Kinsella

Encl.

cc:

E. Blake Mosher (Mosher International, Inc.)

J. Lanier Yeates (Jackson & Walker)

Paul E. Comeaux (Jackson & Walker)

Professor Rosalyn Higgins (London School of Economics)

 

Blake Mosher said, telephone conf. 11/30/93:

 

[Note at end of file: This draft law is similar to the current one enacted, he thinks, in 1992.  It’s currently being debated in parliament.  This draft was probably submitted by some member or group in parliament, and the Lithuanian Chamber of Commerce here was asked to procure comments thereupon.]

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[Update: The book was published April 2, 2020; more information here.]

As noted in previous posts, 1 in 2005 I published International Investment, Political Risk, and Dispute Resolution: A Practitioner’s Guide, co-authored with Noah D. Rubins, an American international arbitration attorney in Paris.  The text has been widely adopted, well-received, and critically praised. For example:

“The book is a tour de force. Rubins & Kinsella have written a first-rate study of one of the most vital areas of international law today. Notwithstanding its subtitle (“A Practitioner’s Guide”), scholars as well as practicing attorneys will find this an invaluable guide to understanding the multifaceted adjudicatory regime for cross-border investment disputes.”
William W. Park, R. Gordon Butler Scholar in International Law and Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law; General Editor, Arbitration InternationalCounsel to Ropes & Gray; former Vice-President, London Court of International Arbitration; publications include the casebook International Commercial ArbitrationInternational Chamber of Commerce Arbitration (3rd ed.); International Forum SelectionIncome Tax Treaty Arbitration; and Arbitration of International Business Disputes: Studies in Law and Practice.

“This book is comprehensive, well-written, and balanced. An admirable mixture of learned commentary and primary documents, it is portable, authoritative, and up-to-date. It is a distinctive and well-organized addition to existing reference works and will be of great value to practioners and academics who seek a dependable, balanced treatment of a range of legal and practical questions affecting foreign direct investment and dispute resolution.”
Jack J. Coe, Jr., Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law; author, Protecting Against the Expropriation Risk in Investing Aboard(Matthew Bender 1993); International Commercial Arbitration–American Principles and Practice (1997); NAFTA Chapter 11 Reports (with Brower and Dodge); vice-chairman, International Commercial Arbitration Committee, ABA International Law Section.

“This book provides an excellent account of how legal techniques can be used to provide significant protections to foreign investment. Its comprehensive coverage, clarity of expression, and useful appendices will prove invaluable to the busy lawyer. It is one of those rare books that is valuable not only for practice but also for the law classroom.”
Professor Dan Sarooshi, Professor of Public International Law, University of Oxford; Barrister, London; author of International Organizations And Their Exercise Of Sovereign Powers and The United Nations and the Development of Collective Security: The Delegation by the UN Security Council of Its Chapter VII Powers

But a lot has happened in law and international arbitral practice since 2005, so it’s time for an update. Noah and I have enlisted the help of a third co-author to contribute to a second edition, which Oxford University Press—UK has agreed to publish. It should be out in March 2020. Available for preorder: OUP Product Page.

The book will be part of the Oxford International Arbitration Series, and will include a preface by the Series Editor, Professor Loukas Mistelis. It will be promoted alongside other leading investment arbitration titles such as McLachlan, Shore and Weiniger’s International Investment Arbitration and Irmgard Marboe’s Calculation of Compensation and Damages in International Investment Law. As noted on the OUP-UK site,

The [Oxford International Arbitration Series] publishes books of quality and originality on subjects of practical importance in modern international arbitration, focusing on emerging topics and pervasive issues. The series provides both practitioner and scholarly readers with titles which offer a high standard of analysis.

Our new co-author is an impressive scholar: Thomas N. Papanastasiou, an Assistant Professor of the Law Faculty of Neapolis University of Paphos (Cyprus). Thomas is licensed to practice with the Athens Bar, and holds a Ph.D. with a focus on International Investment Law and an M.A. in International Relations from Waseda University of Tokyo, as well as an LL.M. in Civil Procedure, and an LL.B. from Kapodistrian University of Athens (Greece). He has worked as a consultant to international organizations, such as the World Bank and to consulting firms in Japan and Europe. His research focuses on public international law, foreign investments, energy law, international development and human rights; his publications include: The Legal Protection of Foreign Investments against Political Risk: Japanese Business in the Asian Energy Sector (Quid Pro Books, 2015; Amazon); and Corruption in the Infrastructure Provision: The Role of Accountability Mechanisms in the Community Driven Development Projects of Indonesia (NOVA Publishers, 2016).

My other co-author, Noah D. Rubins, an American international arbitration attorney in Paris, also has extremely impressive credentials and experience. Noah is an attorney in the international arbitration and public international law groups of Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer in Paris. He has advised and represented sovereign and private clients in arbitrations under ICSID, ICC, AAA, Stockholm Arbitration Institute, and UNCITRAL rules, and has also served as arbitrator under the UNCITRAL and ICC Rules. He specializes in investment arbitration, particularly under the auspices of bilateral investment treaties and NAFTA. Co-author of Investor-State Arbitration (forthcoming), he has published widely in the field of international investment and dispute resolution, and has taught foreign investment law at Georgetown Law Center in Washington, DC. He received a Masters degree in dispute resolution and public international law from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, a J.D. from Harvard Law School, and a bachelor’s degree in international relations from Brown University. Before entering the law, Noah served as attaché at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, and founded a foreign-policy think tank in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan.

The current version of IIPR sells for only $245—what a bargain compared to my other books (e.g. $3487.00 for the seven-volume Digest of Commercial Laws of the World published by Thomson/Reuters).

***

Update: All revised and new chapters submitted, new Preface and Introduction completed. So now it’s in the publisher’s hands. Publication is expected in March 2020. Here’s the current graphic for the cover.

  1.  Preface and Introduction to International Investment, Political Risk, and Dispute Resolution: A Practitioner’s Guide and New Publisher, Co-Editor for my Legal Treatise, and how I got started with legal publishing. []
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In a previous post 1 I mentioned how I got started in legal publishing as part of my law career. One of the books I mentioned was International Investment, Political Risk, and Dispute Resolution: A Practitioner’s Guide, co-authored with Noah D. Rubins, an American international arbitration attorney in Paris. This book was published in 2005 by Oceana Publications, which was then acquired by Oxford University Press. The publisher recently granted permission for me to publish the Preface and Introduction and some ancillary material such as the index and table of contents. It may be downloaded here (in PDF form). They are also provided below.

[Update.]

Many of my free market and libertarian friends know mainly of my writing and in those areas, but I’ve also published a good deal on the legal and practitioner side—not that there is no overlap between them (for example, I’ve written on IP law, as a lawyer, as well as IP policy, as a libertarian). This book is primarily legal and practitioner related (but also attempts to present the material in a detailed, scholarly way), but one driving goal for this project was to help find practical, legal ways to protect property rights of capitalistic companies and investors from takings by the host state. That is one reason my dedication was to Hans-Hermann Hoppe, the world’s preeminent Austrian economist and libertarian theorist. I explained some of our motivation for writing the book in the Preface:

As globalization continues, foreign direct investment, including investment in developing economies, continues to grow each year as well. Political risk—the risk that a host government will interfere with the property rights of a foreign investor—is therefore a topic increasingly central to strategic discussions within both governments and the international business community. While domestic legal, economic and political considerations are critical to assessing political risk, international law also plays an important role. State responsibility for investor protection, treaties protecting foreign investment, political risk insurance, the immunity of states from suit in national courts, and international arbitration between states and investors are just a few of the matters governed or affected by evolving principles of international law.

There has long been a need for a current reference work integrating these and other issues related to international investment and political risk. Many of the relevant topics have been addressed in law journals or monographs, but never as part of an integrated analysis of political risk. And while there is certainly a wealth of material concerning the international law of investment protection, much of it is written from an academic viewpoint rather than from the perspective of assisting businesses and governments in avoiding or reacting to the conflict between interests private and public, foreign and domestic.

The 1997 Oceana monograph Protecting Foreign Investment Under International Law: Legal Aspects of Political Risk, penned by one of the present volume’s co-authors and his former colleague, Paul Comeaux, was written to address these and other topics. As one reviewer wrote, “The book is very useful for beginners as an introduction and easier to access and use than the much more comprehensive and in-depth studies by Sornarajah and Muchlinski.” 2  Another commented:

This book provides an in depth analysis of the political risk associated with foreign investment—that the host government may decide to nationalize, or otherwise interfere with, alien property rights. It succinctly identifies the decisional factors including treaties, political risk insurance, sovereign immunity, and arbitration between States and investors. It serves as a useful primer for investors, corporate counsel, and anyone interested in expropriation litigation disputes. 3

Since the previous book was released eight years ago, far more attention has been paid to some of these topics, in particular investor-state arbitration. This is no surprise: the number of cases registered at the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes between 1997 and 2001 was equal to the number initiated before 1997 since the Centre’s inception in 1965.

The present volume addresses the same issues as did the 1997 work, with updated and expanded coverage. Our goal here is to enable the investor to appreciate the risks associated with government interference in property rights, to minimize those risks and deal effectively with their consequences. But we also hope to promote understanding within host governments about investors’ expectations and concerns, to allow them to avoid conflict and maximize the benefits of foreign direct investment for their countries and constituencies.

This book is addressed to a wide audience, and is written to appeal to lawyers and non-lawyers alike. It is suitable as a primer for attorneys and investors seeking to familiarize themselves with international law pertaining to political risk. It is also addressed to both in-house and outside counsel for corporations who either have made or are contemplating foreign direct investment in developing (or other) countries. Experienced attorneys involved in expropriation-related litigation should also find this book useful as a reference guide to important principles of international law related to political risk. It should also be useful to law students studying international law and academics seeking a reference work pertaining to the legal aspects of international investment and political risk. Last but certainly not least, government officials and attorneys can glean important information about the mindset of foreign investors and their likely course of action should State measures adversely affect their investment. We hope that practitioners will find the sample and source documents in the appendices of use as well, both for comparison purposes and for ease of reference.

We are convinced that the reduction of political risk, through the active participation of both host countries and foreign investors, is a critical factor in the improvement of the human condition worldwide. Entrepreneurship and capital investment are essential to the expansion of prosperity. This conviction, in addition to a more detached enthusiasm for the subject of our practice and research, is one motivation for undertaking this book and, we believe, has spurred us to forcefully explain both how investors can protect themselves, and the ways that host States can make such protection superfluous. It should be noted that, regardless of the authors’ policy preferences, we have attempted to remain strictly objective in evaluating the realities of international law, business, and politics.

… To two individuals we owe special thanks, and it is to these two that we dedicate this book. One of the authors (Kinsella) has been lucky enough to be befriended and informally mentored by Professor Hans-Hermann Hoppe, a leading libertarian theorist and Austrian school economist in the tradition of Ludwig von Mises. Hoppe’s brilliant and tireless advocacy of the principles of individual liberty, sound economics, and international trade, peace and harmony has been an inspiration. …

I am obliged to note here that the material in the file is copyright 2005 Oxford University Press, and is reprinted here by permission of Oxford University Press, USA. The book may be found on Oxford’s website here.

Further information, such as book reviews and online resources and links to various institutions, websites, services, and other resources pertaining to topics discussed throughout the text of the book may be found here.

***

Preface

As globalization continues, foreign direct investment, including investment in developing economies, continues to grow each year as well. Political risk—the risk that a host government will interfere with the property rights of a foreign investor—is therefore a topic increasingly central to strategic discussions within both governments and the international business community. While domestic legal, economic and political considerations are critical to assessing political risk, international law also plays an important role. State responsibility for investor protection, treaties protecting foreign investment, political risk insurance, the immunity of states from suit in national courts, and international arbitration between states and investors are just a few of the matters governed or affected by evolving principles of international law.

There has long been a need for a current reference work integrating these and other issues related to international investment and political risk. Many of the relevant topics have been addressed in law journals or monographs, but never as part of an integrated analysis of political risk. And while there is certainly a wealth of material concerning the international law of investment protection, much of it is written from an academic viewpoint rather than from the perspective of assisting businesses and governments in avoiding or reacting to the conflict between interests private and public, foreign and domestic.

The 1997 Oceana monograph Protecting Foreign Investment Under International Law: Legal Aspects of Political Risk, penned by one of the present volume’s co-authors and his former colleague, Paul Comeaux, was written to address these and other topics. As one reviewer wrote, “The book is very useful for beginners as an introduction and easier to access and use than the much more comprehensive and in-depth studies by Sornarajah and Muchlinski.”[1] Another commented:

This book provides an in depth analysis of the political risk associated with foreign investment—that the host government may decide to nationalize, or otherwise interfere with, alien property rights. It succinctly identifies the decisional factors including treaties, political risk insurance, sovereign immunity, and arbitration between States and investors. It serves as a useful primer for investors, corporate counsel, and anyone interested in expropriation litigation disputes.[2]

Since the previous book was released eight years ago, far more attention has been paid to some of these topics, in particular investor-state arbitration. This is no surprise: the number of cases registered at the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes between 1997 and 2001 was equal to the number initiated before 1997 since the Centre’s inception in 1965.

The present volume addresses the same issues as did the 1997 work, with updated and expanded coverage. Our goal here is to enable the investor to appreciate the risks associated with government interference in property rights, to minimize those risks and deal effectively with their consequences. But we also hope to promote understanding within host governments about investors’ expectations and concerns, to allow them to avoid conflict and maximize the benefits of foreign direct investment for their countries and constituencies.

This book is addressed to a wide audience, and is written to appeal to lawyers and non-lawyers alike. It is suitable as a primer for attorneys and investors seeking to familiarize themselves with international law pertaining to political risk. It is also addressed to both in-house and outside counsel for corporations who either have made or are contemplating foreign direct investment in developing (or other) countries. Experienced attorneys involved in expropriation-related litigation should also find this book useful as a reference guide to important principles of international law related to political risk. It should also be useful to law students studying international law and academics seeking a reference work pertaining to the legal aspects of international investment and political risk. Last but certainly not least, government officials and attorneys can glean important information about the mindset of foreign investors and their likely course of action should State measures adversely affect their investment. We hope that practitioners will find the sample and source documents in the appendices of use as well, both for comparison purposes and for ease of reference.

We are convinced that the reduction of political risk, through the active participation of both host countries and foreign investors, is a critical factor in the improvement of the human condition worldwide. Entrepreneurship and capital investment are essential to the expansion of prosperity. This conviction, in addition to a more detached enthusiasm for the subject of our practice and research, is one motivation for undertaking this book and, we believe, has spurred us to forcefully explain both how investors can protect themselves, and the ways that host States can make such protection superfluous. It should be noted that, regardless of the authors’ policy preferences, we have attempted to remain strictly objective in evaluating the realities of international law, business, and politics.

Before concluding these brief prefatory remarks, a few words of thanks are in order. We would like to thank Mr. Frederic Sourgens for his research assistance, Farouk Yala, Avocat à la Cour, Paris, for helpful comments and suggestions, and Ms. M.C. Susan De Maio of Oceana Publications for her encouragement in the preparation and revision of a book-length treatment of these topics. Our gratitude also to Masha Rubins and Cindy DeLaney Kinsella for their support and encouragement as we spent many hours in the preparation of this book.

To two individuals we owe special thanks, and it is to these two that we dedicate this book. One of the authors (Kinsella) has been lucky enough to be befriended and informally mentored by Professor Hans-Hermann Hoppe, a leading libertarian theorist and Austrian school economist in the tradition of Ludwig von Mises. Hoppe’s brilliant and tireless advocacy of the principles of individual liberty, sound economics, and international trade, peace and harmony has been an inspiration. Gratitude also to Alfred Rubin (no relation), Professor Emeritus at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, whose unflagging drive for precision about the impreciseness of international law made a lasting impression on the other author of this book. Professor Rubin demonstrated through his teaching and research that a clear head and a warm heart are fully compatible, and for that his students will always admire him.

One final note. While this book is intended to shed some light on the interaction between international law, foreign investment, and political risk, a book cannot substitute for the advice of an attorney with information and expertise in the particular circumstances of each situation. We encourage anyone requiring counsel in the matters discussed in this book to consult an attorney for individualized advice and assistance.

The authors finally inform all and sundry that the opinions expressed in this book are solely their own, and should not to be attributed to any entity or person other than themselves.

Noah Rubins
N. Stephan Kinsella
August, 2005

[1] T. Wälde review, CEPMLP Internet Journal, vol. 3 (1998) www.dundee.ac.uk/cepmlp/. See also review by Assad Omer, Transnational Corporations, vol. 10, no. 1 (UNCTAD, April 2001).

[2] American Society of International Law: Reader’s Corner (Issue #16, June 1998), www.lawschool.cornell.edu/lawlibrary/asil/16READ.html.

Introduction

The last century witnessed two important economic counter-currents affecting the international investment community. On the one hand, institutionalized respect for individual rights has spread swiftly across many parts of the globe. On the other hand, collectivist ideologies, political clashes, and misunderstandings between the developing and developed world[1] have led at times to massive nationalizations and confiscations of the property of investors from capital-exporting states. As the prominent Danish legal scholar Isi Foighel once pointed out,

[i]f we wish to pick out one single feature of the social-economic character of the 20th century, one fact accompanying the technical development will strike us very forcibly: the direct and indirect interference by government action with private property.[2]

Most of these nationalizations and confiscations were takings of property invested in developing states in the form of so-called “foreign direct investment.” Foreign direct investment refers to direct or indirect control of either assets or an enterprise in a foreign country through ownership of a substantial portion of the assets or enterprise.[3] It is “investment that is made to acquire a lasting interest in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of an investor, the investor’s purpose being to have an effective voice in the management of the enterprise.”[4] One commentator defined “foreign direct investment” in the following terms:

[Foreign direct investment] may best be defined as the creation, acquisition or endowment in the host country of enterprises, either incorporated as branches, subsidiaries, or associate companies, or in the form of unincorporated enterprises or joint ventures. The desired result is to acquire a lasting interest, with powers of management and control, where the investor’s return depends upon the performance of the enterprise. [Foreign direct investment] flows include all funds provided by the investor, specifically, equity capital, reinvested earnings, and net borrowings. Equity investment that does not meet this standard constitutes portfolio investment which is placed through the capital markets without entrepreneurial commitment and merely for the sake of capital yield.[5]

Foreign direct investment (FDI) as a mode of economic activity offers impressive benefits for both investors and host states that cannot be gleaned from portfolio investment. From the private party’s standpoint, FDI provides a platform for implementing improvements, seizing on potential efficiency and synergy gains, and otherwise gaining advantage from the investor’s own initiative, innovation, and vision. From the government’s perspective, FDI is a potential engine for development, as the foreigner employs and trains local personnel, indirectly encourages secondary service providers and producers of goods, pays taxes, and—in some case—leaves behind valuable know-how.[6]

But FDI’s benefits for all cannot come without concomitant risks. In order to obtain the necessary control over local operations, the investor must “invest himself,” placing his money, equipment, personnel, and day-to-day operations within the sphere of the host State’s local law, customs, and political vagaries.[7] For developing state governments, meanwhile, the political pressure to extract additional benefits for local constituents grows as the foreign-owned enterprise prospers. Particularly in times of social and economic instability, host governments may be tempted to redistribute some of the foreigner’s property to achieve political gain. Such a shift of property may take any number of forms, from direct nationalization by fiat to increases in taxes, fees, or investment requirements.

Furthermore, the salubrious effect of FDI on the economy of developing countries is hardly undisputed. Some argue that freedom of investment equals a license for multinational corporations to pillage the assets of poorer countries, buying resources for less than their true value and expatriating them to the home country. At the very least, the influx of capital does not necessarily mean that the profits gained from that investment will remain in the developing host country. Between 1965 and 1986, “net transfers” on FDI, meaning the flow of investment adjusted for the repatriation of profits, was either negative or only slightly positive.[8] Therefore, some have argued that an increase in direct investment into a less-developed country may not necessarily provide substantial support for long-term development projects, infrastructure improvements, or other welfare-enhancing activities.[9] Additionally, the drain of repatriating profits may in fact harm a capital-importing country’s balance of payments, if FDI flows are not consistently renewed and outward transfer of profits continues.

These concerns were part of the impetus that drove the “new international economic order” movement among developing countries. In 1974, as part of a movement that became known as the “New International Economic Order” (NIEO), a large number of States initiated a campaign against the prevailing norms of equal treatment for foreign investors, culminating in a United Nations resolution known as the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States.[10] These States advocated preferential treatment for local capital. The Charter set forth a new standard for the treatment of investments, although the standard was vehemently opposed by developed countries in the General Assembly: “Every State has and shall freely exercise full permanent sovereignty, including possession, use and disposal, over all its wealth, natural resources and economic activities.”[11] While the general exhortatory provisions of the Charter were approved by a wide margin, the most controversial provision—Article 2, which purported to remove the act of nationalization from the protections of international law—was passed over the objections of all the major industrialized nations, as well as several developing countries.[12]

In this atmosphere of conflicting interests, some governments in the Middle East and Africa turned to nationalization of foreign investment as an economic and political tool, in part as an assertion of “permanent sovereignty” over natural resources following de-colonialization.[13] Many of these expropriations took place despite elaborate, long-term concessions that the host States had granted to foreign investors.[14] Expropriations of foreign investment continued into the 1970s in States such as Uganda, Ethiopia, Pakistan, and Iran. By 1980, the only OPEC States where oil concessions benefitting multinational corporations remained in effect were the United Arab Emirates and Libya. This represented a substantial deterioration in stability from the middle part of this century.[15] (These historical developments are elaborated in Chapter 5.)

However, the NIEO ultimately had little impact on targeted institutions such as the Bretton Woods system, the GATT, and WTO. Subsequent attempts to include NIEO principles in documents elaborating development strategy also failed to obtain any consensus.[16] By the beginning of the 1990s, with the fall of Communist regimes in Europe and the onset of debt crises throughout the developing world (caused in part by centralized planning and protectionism) the NIEO appeared to have fallen into wide disfavor. In its place, a more balanced, pragmatic approach to foreign economic participation gained currency, one that recognized both the so-called humanitarian risks of unregulated capitalism and the simple fact that “less-developed countries compete on a worldwide scale for scarce private investment capital, and that capital will not come unless there is security and a good chance of profit making.”[17]

In recent years, the attitudes of developing States toward foreign direct investment have continued to shift, and foreign direct investment flows to developing States are increasing. In the second half of the 1980s, investment increased from Western Europe and North America to developing countries in Asia, Latin America, and Eastern Europe.[18] Foreign direct investment worldwide increased three times faster than domestic output,[19] peaking at US$ 1.3 trillion in 2001.[20] In Central and Eastern Europe alone, foreign direct investment has increased from almost nothing in 1989 to a projected $28 billion by the end of 2003.[21]

While some states have been cautious in welcoming foreign direct investment, others have begun avidly to pursue capital inflows, in part by privatizing formerly state-run enterprises.[22] In the Philippines, for example the state has accelerated privatization of the telephone, steel, electricity, paper, and oil industries.[23] In Mexico, the national telephone company is partially owned by American and French companies, and Pemex, the national oil company, is planning to sell petrochemical plants to foreign investors.[24]

As part of this same gradual liberalizing process, the oil and gas companies that suffered nationalization in the 1970s are now returning to their former hosts for new projects.[25] By 1992, Tunisia, Egypt, Oman, Yemen, and Syria had begun to allow foreign participation in their oil industries.[26] Algeria also now permits joint ventures with foreign oil companies, provided that the state oil company retains a controlling share.[27] In November, 1994, Azerbaijan approved the “Deal of the Century,” a $7.5 billion development deal with a consortium of foreign oil companies.[28] Morris Adelman, an expert in oil economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, opines that in the Middle East “[t]hose countries have realized that nationalization has been a lousy way to run their oil business. They now know that throwing out the oil companies with their technical expertise and big money was a terrible mistake.”[29]

According to at least one World Bank official, “[t]he present interest in privatization is no fad. . . . Lessons have been learned . . . and today’s strategies reflect those lessons.”[30] Foreign markets are being re-opened to foreign investment in many parts of the world, and this tendency is likely to continue. Along with the rejection of nationalization as a useful development model, there has been an increasing recognition of the crucial importance of property rights.[31] States formerly hostile to foreign investment are beginning to enact investment codes favorable to investors,[32] and are beginning to adopt legal and business methodologies familiar to foreign enterprises, such as Anglo-American methods of contract interpretation.[33] Many developing states have also passed legislation guaranteeing compensation in the event of expropriation,[34] and have entered into bilateral investment treaties with capital-exporting countries, which normally establish a range of baseline guarantees to qualifying investors.

Also, in a reversal of the previously dominant doctrine that investment disputes should be resolved under the laws and within the judicial system of the host state,[35] many developing states have enacted investment laws allowing for settlement of disputes in a neutral forum, using the facilities and procedural rules of arbitral institutions such as the International Chamber of Commerce and International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes.[36] Likewise, regional and bilateral investment treaties have multiplied around the globe, often providing foreign investors both substantive protections and mandatory arbitration of disputes.[37] Finally, there have been a number of incentives offered by developing states to attract foreign direct investment, including tax breaks, inexpensive financing, and land at reduced prices.[38]

To some degree, these changes were probably brought about as a result of competition among developing states for FDI. As developing states’ demand for foreign direct investment increased in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the supply of available capital was decreasing significantly.[39] While FDI to developing countries reached a peak of US$17.24 billion in 1981, it fell to US$11.86 billion in 1982 and US$7.8 billion in 1983.[40] This was due in part to rising interest rates and falling commodity prices, causing many developing states to default on their debts to Western banks in the 1980s.[41] This series of defaults caused some international banks and investors to tighten the supply of capital flowing to these States. Many multinationals took to borrowing funds from their foreign subsidiaries, rather than injecting capital into them.[42] One way States found to attract an ever-smaller pool of foreign funds was to liberalize the local regulatory regime, and to provide other guarantees that reduce the political risk that would otherwise make investing expensive.[43] As Professors Wälde and Weiler explain:

It is at first sight perhaps difficult to understand why governments would voluntarily limit their sovereignty by submitting to such processes of arbitration-enforced discipline. One needs to realise, though, that by accepting such external, politically less malleable, discipline a country gains in reputation, in lowering its political risk reputation and by enhancing its ability to participate and benefit fully from the global economy. Governments who don’t are seen as higher risk and therefore penalised, usually with good reason, in many ways by investors and the global markets. Submitting to such external disciplines also provides governments with a defense against domestic pressure groups—business lobbies and ideological interest groups—which can often capture the domestic regulatory machinery and manoeuvre it for protectionist policies which in the end damage the country at large and wealth-creating potential of the global economy.[44]

Developing states also strengthen investment protections because, as explained above, FDI benefits both the citizens of the host State and the investor. For example, by the end of the 1970s developing countries were becoming aware of an increasing technology gap between North and South. They realized that encouraging FDI was a more effective means of developing and importing high technology than purchasing it directly.[45] In addition,

[b]ecause [FDI] is not a debt creating instrument requiring regular payments and generating continuous demands on the host country’s balance of payments, only when the investment earns a profit are payments implied, thereby placing part of the risk on the foreign investor.[46]

Foreign direct investment also helps the host State by creating more opportunities for local subcontractors and suppliers.[47] An additional rationale for accepting FDI is summarized by former ICSID Secretary General Ibrahim Shihata:

First, direct investment does not simply provide funds, but an integrated package of financial resources, managerial skills, technical knowledge, and marketing connections. Second, it is not a debt-creating instrument; the investor bears the risks of project failure, while a lender has the right to be repaid regardless of how effectively the borrowed funds were used. Third, other indirect but important attributes of this form of capital relate to benefits that insure the introduction of efficient and internationally competitive enterprises in local economy. In the long run, direct foreign investment can foster a general improvement in production by stimulating the adoption of improved techniques and management in other sectors of the economy, and among local entrepreneurs. Fourth, foreign investment often works as a catalyst for associated lending for specific projects, thus increasing the overall availability of external resources for productive purposes. Also, foreign investors often act as lobbyists in their home countries for the benefit of their projects in developing countries.[48]

As a consequence of the market liberalization described above and developing States’ apparent embrace of FDI, one might assume that foreign investors can look forward to ever-decreasing political risk in the twenty-first century.[49] But despite new laws and treaties, as well as a new culture of mutual benefit between capital exporters and capital importers, the potential for a trend reversal remains real, and political risk concerns persist.[50]

While the United Nations’ Centre on Transnational Corporations has argued that nationalization will represent a minimal risk in the future, this conclusion has been challenged as optimistic:

This conclusion must be seen as optimistic if account is taken of the fact that the year 1975 was in the middle of a severe economic crisis for many countries in the developing world, as a result of the rise in oil prices and the accompanying world recession. These countries not only had by that time to search for outside assistance, but also to turn to the IMF for help. One of the conditions of such help required them to relax their previous attitudes toward private foreign investment and to encourage the return of multinational corporations. It is by no means clear, therefore, that the postulated changes in attitudes, born partly of economic crises, will be permanent.[51]

More importantly, today host states can interfere with private property and foreign investment more subtly than through direct confiscation and transfer of title. Over the last twenty years, the risk of indirect or de facto expropriation, or of other, less extreme interference, has come to the forefront of business consciousness in the developing world. Thus, even when an investor remains in full control of his assets, he may find their value evaporated no less effectively than in an outright taking.[52] In post-1979 Iran, for example, the government commonly imposed a requirement that companies hire “managers” appointed by the State, who effectively directed the company’s activities for the State’s benefit. In Argentina during the most recent crisis, the government converted private contracts denominated in U.S. dollars to Argentine pesos at a one-to-one exchange rate, although the peso had dropped to a value of under 30 cents.[53] This measure had the effect of shifting as much as two-thirds of private investors’ revenues to consumers, who benefited from artificially low prices.

Risks such as these are relatively low in a stable country with well-developed legal institutions, where the rule of law is normally assiduously defended and property rights protected.[54] For example, a Belgian national investing in a power project or oil and gas properties in the United States will be reasonably confident that, in the event that the government were to confiscate her property, she would have recourse in the courts to challenge the action and to obtain full compensation for the value of the property taken.[55]

On the other hand, if the same Belgian national were investing in a project in Russia, and Russia were to take unfair measures affecting her property, the investor’s domestic remedies may be limited, given doubts about the independence of the judiciary and the robustness of the rule of law.[56] Nevertheless, the political risks described in this book are not restricted only to developing and transition economies. Indeed, recent cases before NAFTA arbitration tribunals and the European Court of Human Rights demonstrate that overzealous regulators and the demands of local interest groups at times can make even the most “advanced” country a risky place for the foreign investor.[57]

Whether an investor brings capital to a developed or developing country, how can he assess and manage the incumbent political risk before deciding whether to invest? What can an investor do to deter manifestations of political risk once the investment has been made? How can international law be brought to bear as protection against political risk? Finally, what remedies are available if political risk materializes to the investor’s detriment? This book is an attempt to suggest some answers to these questions.

In the first part of the text, we offer guidance on the assessment and pre-investment management of political risk. In Chapter 1, we discuss the types of political risk that foreign investors are likely to encounter, and suggest some practical steps that might be taken to measure such risk in a particular State before investing capital. We then turn to the actions that the investor can take to reduce exposure to political risk prior to investing. Chapter 2 analyzes the types of investment projects most often undertaken in developing states, and provides an analysis of the structures that can be implemented to reduce exposure to political risk. Chapter 3 deals with the modalities of political risk insurance, which typically provides coverage against non-commercial risks such as currency inconvertibility, expropriation, and war, and is available from nationally-sponsored insurance agencies, private insurance companies, and the World Bank’s Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency.

In the second part of the book, we turn to the international law framework of investment protection and political risk. Chapter 4 covers the general background international law pertaining to state responsibility, in particular state responsibility incurred in relation to foreign investment, as well as the general nature and types of remedies available to investors when a state expropriates an investor’s property or interferes with its investment. In Chapter 5, we discuss the principles of customary international law related to expropriation. This chapter includes an overview of the historical development of the international law of expropriation, as developed in international arbitration decisions, commentators, treaties, and state practice. The current state of the customary international law of expropriation is also discussed, including the various substantive protections established in customary and conventional international law, such as the “full compensation” standard for expropriation, the public purpose requirement, and the prohibition against discrimination.

Investors look not only to customary international law principles, however, they increasingly rely on the substantive protections provided in a growing number of investment treaties. The modern international law of investment protection as embodied in multilateral and bilateral investment treaties, including principles such as fair and equitable treatment, and full protection and security, is covered in Chapter 6. Also included is a detailed discussion of methods of valuation of damaged or expropriated property. Chapter 7 concerns the jurisdictional requirements for invoking investment treaty protections—who has standing to maintain a claim, what assets qualify as protected “investments,” and the effect of related contractual forum selection clauses.

Finally, in a third section, we provide practical guidance on the procedural recourse available to investors who face political risks that have materialized. In Chapter 8, we provide an overview of international arbitration procedure—both under arbitration treaties and contractual arrangements—particularly under the auspices of the World Bank’s International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and arbitration rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). Next, Chapter 9 addresses the possibility of mediation, conciliation, and other non-litigious forms of alternative dispute resolution, methods which have drawn significant attention in recent years. In Chapter 10, we discuss the actions that an investor’s home government may take to protect the investor in response to unreasonable host-State interference with investment.

Every author must ultimately end his research and choose his field of battle, even so broad a field as the one we attempt to cover here. This book is limited in scope to the topics just described, and does not address the related and vitally important topics of commercial risk involved in direct foreign investment;[58] business, financial, or tax strategies for FDI;[59] or political risks connected with import/export transactions and portfolio investment.[60] Nor do we discuss the political risks of any particular country in detail. Because such risks necessarily evolve over time, such a discussion would be of limited value. There are, however, several services that provide up-to-date political risk assessment on a country-by-country basis.[61]

* * *

Cross-border investment has become a central driving force in local economies around the world. Indeed, more than ever private investment and trade, as much as national politics, shape the development of global commerce.[62] In part through the management of political risk, private parties—and their counsel—are today called upon to help draw the contours of international law alongside national legislatures and executives.[63]

This unconscious collaboration may at first seem an odd result of the historical clash between capital importers and capital exporters. But on further reflection, it is only natural that private investors and the States where they seek their fortune should find common ground, even if by way of occasional collisions. The increased flow of investment means new opportunities for those businesses willing and able to assess and address political risk, and at the same time offers the surest path to sustainable growth for countries too small or impecunious to rely on domestic capital. Furthermore, the tables have begun to turn on the traditional capital exporting States: formerly less-developed countries now invest heavily abroad, including projects in Western Europe and North America. Some of the world’s industrialized powers are therefore softening their previously uncompromising pro-investor approach in anticipation of conflicts where roles will be reversed and they will be compelled to defend their own regulatory actions.[64]

Therefore, most foreign investment participants today understand the delicate balance between international law constraints and the legitimate interests of development and sovereignty.[65] The increased control over political risk that private investors now enjoy, in part as a result of the investment treaties that states themselves conclude, is mutually beneficial. States have insulated themselves from external political pressure and lowered the cost of foreign investment by demonstrating their resolve to provide a predictable investment climate. At the same time, private investors must properly appreciate the extent of their new rights if they are to lower political risk and the accompanying financial burden.

In this guide, we hope to provide the non-specialist lawyer, business person, or government official with the tools necessary to understand the international law of investment and its relationship to political risk. If we have succeeded in our task, the reader will be better equipped to better choose between investment opportunities, negotiate, safeguard investments, and react efficiently to the consequences of political risk.

[Endnotes; some formatting may be missing]

[1] Developing states have often accused multinational corporations of adopting overly capital-intensive production techniques and making insufficient transfers of technology. Klaus P. Berger, The New Multilateral Investment Guaranty Agency Globalizing the Investment Insurance Approach Towards Development, 15 Syr. J. Int’l L. & Com. 13, 31 (1988).

[2] Isi Foighel, Nationalization: A Study In The Protection Of Alien Property In International Law 13 (1957).

[3] Thomas L. Brewer, International Investment Dispute Settlement Procedures: The Evolving Regime for Foreign Direct Investment, 26 Law & Pol’y Int’l Bus. 633, 634 (1995); see also Cheryl W. Gray & William W. Jarosz, Law and the Regulation of Foreign Direct Investment: The Experience from Central and Eastern Europe, 33 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 1, 1 (1995). Different countries use different threshold levels of ownership, usually between ten and twenty-five percent, to distinguish foreign direct investment from so-called “portfolio investment.” Brewer, supra, at n2.

[4] International Monetary Fund, Balance Of Payments Manual para. 408 at 136 (4th ed. 1977). Thus, “[w]ith respect to foreign direct investment, a foreign investor retains at least part of the ownership and control, unlike [official development assistance] and private bank lending where the business is owned and controlled by local companies or entrepreneurs.” Berger, supra note 1, at 17.

[5] Berger, supra note 1, at 17 (references omitted).

[6] See generally UNCTAD/U.N.E.P., Foreign Direct Investment and the Promotion of Sustainable Human Development (1999); J.P. Agarwal, Effect of Foreign Direct Investment on Employment in Home Countries, 6 Transnat’l Corporations 1 (1997); See also Running into the Sand, Why a failure at the Cancun Trade Talks threatens the world’s poorest people, OXFAM Briefing Paper no. 53, September 2, 2003, at page 33, available at www.oxfamamerica.org/pdfs/wto_brief_090203.pdf (foreign direct investment can play a crucial role in development by transferring capital, technology and skills into developing countries; UNCTAD research indicates that the number of regulatory changes in the domestic foreign investment regulations of the relevant countries during the relevant period was over 1,300, 95% of which were aimed at facilitating foreign investment) (citing UNCTAD, World Investment Report, Geneva (2002)).

[7] The distinction between “investing” and “investing oneself” was best articulated by Professors Carreau and Juillard in Dominique Carreau & Patrick Juillard, Droit International Economique 387 (2003) (“Il faut non seulement que l’investisseur investisse, mais encore qu’il s’investisse”).

[8] World Bank, 1 World Debt Tables 1992-93, at 20-21 (1992).

[9] Ibrahim Shihata, Legal Treatment of Foreign Investment: The World Bank Guidelines 9 (1993).

[10] G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.31), at 50, 51-55, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974), reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 251, 252-60 (1975), available at www.un.org/documents/resga.htm. See Patricia Robin, The BIT Won’t Bite: The American Bilateral Investment Treaty Program, 33 Am. U.L. Rev. 931, n.93 (1984).

[11] 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 52, 14 I.L.M. at 254-55, supra note 10.

[12] Robert von Mehren & P. Nicholas Kourides, International Arbitration between States and Foreign Private Parties: The Libyan Nationalization Cases, 75 A.J.I.L. 476, 523 (1981).

[13] On the concept of permanent sovereignty and rights to oil deposits in international law see David M. Ong, Joint Development of Common Offshore Oil and Gas Deposits: “Mere” State Practice or Customary International Law? 93 A.J.I.L. 771 (1999).

[14] See Vratislav Pechota, The 1981 U.S.-Czechoslovak Claims Settlement Agreement: An Epilogue to Postwar Nationalization and Expropriation Disputes, 76 A.J.I.L. 639. See also Rode, The American-Polish Claims Settlement Agreement of March 30, 1960, 55 A.J.I.L. 452 (1961); Gordon Christenson, U.S.-Rumanian Agreement of March 30, 1960, 55 A.J.I.L. 452 (1961); Richard B. Lillich, The United States-Bulgarian Claims Agreement of 1963, 58 A.J.I.L. 187 (1964); Branko Peselj, The New Yugoslav-American Claims Agreement, 59 A.J.I.L. 362 (1965); Expropriation in the Americas (Andreas Lowenfeld, ed., 1971); Eric N. Baklanoff, Expropriation Of U.S. Investment In Cuba, Mexico, And Chile (1975).

[15] Edith Penrose, George Joffe & Paul Stevens, Nationalization of Foreign-Owned Property for a Public Purpose: An Economic Perspective on Appropriate Compensation, 55 Modern L. Rev. 351, 353 (1992).

[16] Russel Lawrence Barsh, A Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly Rethinks the Economic Rights and Duties of States, 85 A.J.I.L. 192, 192-93 (1991).

[17] Frank Ruddy, Book Review: Foreign Investment in the Present and a New International Economic Order, 84 A.J.I.L. 961, 962 (1990).

[18] Gray & Jarosz, supra note 3, at 5.

[19] U.N. Department of Econ. & Social Development, Transnational Corporations and Management Division, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORTS 1992: TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AS ENGINES OF GROWTH at 4, U.N.Doc. ST/CTC/130, U.N. Sales No. E.92.II.A.19 (1992). Foreign direct investments to developing countries has increased dramatically over the past several years. MULTILATERAL INVESTMENT GUARANTY AGENCY (MIGA), ANNUAL REPORT, 2004, available at www.miga.org.

[20] Guy de Jonquieres, Foreign Direct Investment flow set to begin recovery UNCTAD DATA, Financial Times (London, England), January 13, 2004 at 11; on the 2001 figures, see Frances Williams, Investment flows grow strongly, Financial Times (London, England), August 4, 2001 at 6. FDI subsequently fell sharply from 2001 to 2002, to US$653 million. Seen in context, however, foreign direct investment is again growing at a healthy clip. The 2001 volume of foreign direct investment was unusually high due to the perceived need for consolidation in the European Union and the United States, as well as inflated stock prices before the high-tech collapse of 2001. Since many of the transactions in the telecommunications market and the technology sector were made in stock, prices were probably inflated above the actual value of these mergers.

[21] Stefan Wagstyl, Investment flows into region at record levels: Although still beset by problems, much of the former Communist bloc is also experiencing surprising economic growth, Financial Times (London, England), October 21, 2003 at FT Report—Central and Eastern Europe: Finance Pg. 1.

[22] Anna Gelpern & Malcolm Harrison, Ideology, Practice, and Performance in Privatization: A Case Study of Argentina, 33 HARV. INT’L L.J. 240 (1992) (“at least eighty-three countries were conducting some significant form of privatization” by the early 1990s).

[23] Id. at 256.

[24] Id. at 238.

[25] Allanna Sullivan, Plunging Back: Western Oil Giants Return to the Countries That Threw Them Out, Wall Street J., Mar. 5, 1995, § A, at 1, col. 1 (“Conoco’s return to Iran is the latest in a wave of such U-turns. British Petroleum Co., expelled 16 years ago by Nigeria over the issue of apartheid in South Africa, is back in Nigeria despite a despotic military regime there. Mobil Corp., which fled Viet Nam in 1975 because of the war, is back even though a border dispute may lead to a brawl with China. Occidental Petroleum Corp., whose holdings in Venezuela were nationalized 19 years ago is back, despite a tottering economic system that could trigger a military coup”).

[26] Penrose et al., supra note 15, at 353.

[27] Id. at 354.

[28] This consortium includes Amoco, British Petroleum, Azerbaijan State Oil Company, UNOCAL, Delta (a Saudi-affiliated entity), Lukoil (Russia), Pennzoil, Statoil (Norway), the Government of Iran, McDermott, RAMCO, and Turkish Petroleum Corp. Commerce, The Official Newsletter Of The C.I.S.-American Chamber Of Commerce 3 (Fall 1995).

[29] Sullivan, supra note 25.

[30] Mary M. Shirley, The What, Why, and How of Privatization: A World Bank Perspective, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. S23, S31-32 (1992).

[31] Brice M. Clagett, Present State of the International Law of Compensation for Expropriated Property and Repudiated State Contracts, in Private Investors Abroad §12.02 (1989) (“Some of the States that had been the most vociferous exponents of Third World ideology began to become exporters of capital and thus to acquire a heightened appreciation of property rights”).

[32] Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, Recent Trends Relating to Entry of Foreign Direct Investment, 9 ICSID REV.—FOR. INV. L.J. 47 (1994). For a discussion of the national foreign direct investment codes of several nations, see Michael A. Geist, Toward a General Agreement on the Regulation of Foreign Direct Investment, 26 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 673, 686-706 (1995); Antonio Parra, Principles Governing Foreign Investment as Reflected in National Investment Codes, 7 ICSID Rev.—For. Inv. L.J. 428 (1992). International organizations have also shifted their emphasis from the regulation of foreign direct investment to the liberalization of government policies toward such investment. See Brewer, supra note 3, at 639; see also OECD, Checklist for Foreign Direct Investment Incentives 2003, available at www.oecd.org/dataoecd/ 45/21/2506900.pdf (providing a guide for policy makers on the liberalization of their home economy in order to attract further investment).

[33] For a discussion of such practices in Central and Eastern Europe, see Gray & Jarosz, supra note 3, at 32.

[34] For examples of such legislation in Central and Eastern Europe, see id., at 29; Geist, supra note 32.

[35] On this so-called “Calvo Doctrine,” see Donald Shea, The Calvo Clause: A Problem of Inter-American and International Law and Diplomacy (1955).

[36] Adeoye Akinsanya, International Protection of Direct Foreign Investments in the Third World, 36 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 58, 70-75 (1987).

[37] See, e.g., Treaty Between the United States of America and the Argentine Republic Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, with Protocol, signed at Washington on November 14, 1991, entered into force October 20, 1994, reprinted at 31 I.L.M. 124 (1992), available at www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/fs/22422.htm. On the wider implication of such investment treaties, see Marian Nash (Leich), U.S. Practice: Bilateral Investment Treaties, 87 A.J.I.L. 433 (1993).

[38] Geist, supra note 32, at 679.

[39] In 1993 and 1994, it is estimated that half of all foreign direct investment flowing to developing countries went to East Asia and to the Pacific, while lower income countries, excluding China and India, received only about US$3 billion. MIGA, Annual Report 1995, available at www.miga.org.

[40] Organization For Economic Cooperation And Development (OECD), Development Cooperation—1984 Review 64, Table IV-1 (1984).

[41] The total debt of developing countries exceeded $950 billion in 1985, causing the international capital flow to developing countries to slow and interest rates to rise. Shihata, supra note 9, at 672.

[42] Id. at 674.

[43] “Political risk” can be broadly defined as the risk that the laws of a country will change to the investor’s detriment after it has invested capital in the country, reducing the value of its investment. Put simply, it is the risk of adverse government intervention. See Philipp Harms, International Investment, Political Risk, and Growth (2000); David A. Jodice, Political Risk Assessment: An Annotated Bibliography (1985).

[44] Thomas Wälde & Todd Weiler, Investment Arbitration under the Energy Charter Treaty in the Light of New NAFTA Precedents, Investment Treaties and Arbitration 159, 161 (G. Kaufmann-Koehler/B. Stucki, eds. 2002).

[45] Berger, supra note 1, at 15.

[46] Id.

[47] Id.

[48] Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, Factors Influencing the Flow of Foreign Investment and the Relevance of a Multilateral Investment Guaranty Scheme, 21 INT’L LAW. 671, 675 (1987).

[49] Expropriations appear to have peaked in 1975 with 83 expropriations in 28 different countries, but declined by fifty percent the following year. Between 1980 and 1985, the rate of expropriation averaged three per year. UN Centre on Transnational Corporations, The New Environment, UNTC Current Studies, Series A, No. 16 (New York: United Nations, 1990), p. 18.

[50] See generally Peter B. Kenen, The International Financial Architecture (2001); Andreas Lowenfeld, International Economic Law 565-616 (2002); Grant Nulle, IMF ignores causes of crisis, Financial Times (London, England), August 18, 2003 at 10; Adam Thomson, Argentina defiant towards private creditors, Financial Times (London, England), March 11, 2004 at 11.

[51] Penrose et al., supra note 15, at 351. See also Amy L. Chua, The Privatization-Nationalization Cycle: The Link Between markets and Ethnicity in Developing Countries, 95 Col. L. Rev. 223 (1995), (arguing that in many States, there is an ongoing cycle of privatization and nationalization).

[52] See Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, Award of March 9, 1998 at para. 103, 40 I.L.M. 36 (2001) (the host state’s regulatory action can have the effect of an outright taking).

[53] Thomson, supra note 50.

[54] Such protection is, however, not absolute. In the United States, for example, the government may impose a range of “restrictions” on the use of property. Many governmental actions in the U.S. which could be considered interference with property rights—such as zoning regulations—are not always considered to be takings by U.S. courts. See generally Richard Epstein, Takings: Private Property And The Power Of Eminent Domain (1985).

[55] In the United States, just compensation for property taken by the State is normally measured by “the market value of the property at the time of the taking.” Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934), aff’d. in United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24 (1984).

[56] See Tamara Lothien & Katharina Pistor, Local Institutions, Foreign Investment and Alternative Strategies of Development: Some Views from Practice, 42 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 101, 106 n.13 (2003) (citing Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index (Aug. 28, 2002) at www.transparency.org (giving Russia a 2.7 out of 10 score for the perceived corruption in Russia where a 10 denotes no corruption), see also Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index (Oct. 7, 2003) at www.transparency.org/cpi/2003/cpi2003.en.html (giving Russia the same 2.7 out of 10 score of the previous year, on par with Mozambique at country rank 86 of a 133 surveyed).

[57] See, e.g., Loewen Group Int’l v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, 42 ILM 811 (2003), Award of June 26, 2003 (a U.S. trial court’s conduct towards a Canadian investor was “a disgrace by any standard” and violated international standards of fair and equitable treatment).

[58] Commercial risks are the types of risks inherent in any business venture, such as the risk of low consumer demand, higher than expected manufacturing costs, insolvency of purchasers, and cost overruns in production. Commercial risk is thus the business risk that remains even in the most stable political climate. While commercial risks affect any business, whether operating in its home country or abroad, these risks are often greater in a developing country due to lack of a developed infrastructure, primitive telecommunications systems, and an unskilled, uneducated, and relatively impoverished consumer base. As a practical matter, however, it may sometimes be difficult to distinguish between political and commercial risks. For example, the failure of a government-operated utility to deliver services to an investor’s facility may be either commercial or political in nature. On commercial risk and commercial risk management, see Tim Boyce, Commercial Risk Management (2003).

[59] Raymond Rody, International Business Negotiations: Strategies, Tactics and Practices (2002); Peter Buckley, The Strategy and Organization of International Business (1993).

[60] Yen Yee Chong, Investment Risk Management (2004).

[61] See The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Reports, available at www.eiu.com; see also The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Risk Service, available at www.eiu.com.

[62] See Susan Strange, The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy (1996); Susan Strange, Mad Money, When Markets Outgrow Governments (1998).

[63] See, e.g., Lothien & Pistor, supra note 56.

[64] See Noah Rubins, Loewen v. United States: The Burial of an Investor-State Claim, 21 Arb. Int’l 1, 32-36 (2005); Guillermo Aguilar Alvarez & William W. Park, The New Face of Investment Arbitration: NAFTA Chapter 11, Mealey’s Int’l Arb. Rep., January 2004 at 39, 41.

[65] The maze of bilateral and multilateral investment treaties bears witness to this development. See e.g. K.V.S.K. Nathan, The ICSID Convention: The Law of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (2000).

  1. New Publisher, Co-Editor for my Legal Treatise, and how I got started with legal publishing[]
  2.  T. Wälde review, CEPMLP Internet Journal, vol. 3 (1998). See also review by Assad Omer, Transnational Corporations, vol. 10, no. 1 (UNCTAD, April 2001). []
  3. American Society of International Law: Reader’s Corner (Issue #16, June 1998). []
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Recent Developments in Jurisprudence and Legislation (1994)

One of my earliest published articles (and delivered speeches). From 1994. HTML from Word version below; PDF. When I was a young lawyer at large law firms, I took every chance I could to publish, get my name out there, etc. (see New Publisher, Co-Editor for my Legal Treatise, and how I got started with legal publishing).

 

 

Recent Developments in Jurisprudence and Legislation

by

Robert O. Thomas & N. Stephan Kinsella

Jackson & Walker, L.L.P.

Houston, Texas

41 LSU Mineral Law Institute Ch. 6 (1994) [continue reading…]

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Stephan Kinsella, “An International Framework for the Protection of Investment,” Philadelphia Lawyer (Fall 1997), p. 20 (PDF)

This is an article I published in the Philadelphia Lawyer, p. 20 (Fall 1997), about the now-defunct Multilateral Agreement on Investment, or MAI. At the time I was in favor of it and somewhat naively optimistic that a fairly universal pro-private property rights agreement might be adopted. Sigh.

For more background on related matters, see my book International Investment, Political Risk, and Dispute Resolution: A Practitioner’s Guide (Oxford University Press, 2005) and my Online Appendix XVII, “Online Resources” [update: International Investment, Political Risk, and Dispute Resolution: A Practitioner’s Guide, Second Edition (Oxford, 2020)].

The Re-emerging International Framework for Protection of Investment

By Stephan Kinsella 1

(version submitted to The Philadelphia Lawyer, September 1997 issue)

We’ll take and take until not even the nails in their shoes are left.  We will take American investments penny by penny until nothing is left.

                                                                                                 —Fidel Castro, 1960  2 

Less than seventy-five years after it officially began, the contest between capitalism and socialism is over: capitalism has won.

                                                                                        —Robert Heilbroner, 1989 3

American entrepreneurs are, by and large, used to operating within a relatively fixed and predictable background of overarching state and federal laws.  If something goes wrong with a business transaction—e.g., one party breaches a contract or intentionally defrauds or harms another—the wronged party that he can very likely resolve the matter in some court, according to some applicable law, whether federal or state.

Similarly, if an investor’s property rights are damaged or otherwise taken by the government, the investor can obtain redress, typically in the form of compensation, in court.  In the West, though protection of property rights is far from perfect, it is largely taken for granted that the government is constitutionally prohibited from taking one’s property (including investments) without due process and just compensation.  Thus, trade and investment flourish in western countries, since both contractual and property rights and protected.

International trade, and investment in foreign countries (known as foreign direct investment), require protection as well. With respect to foreign trade—for example, trade between an American company and a foreign company—the parties cannot simply assume that they are both subject to jurisdiction in the courts of the same nation. Despite this seeming difficulty, however, foreign trade has been able to thrive since disputes can be settled, and contracts enforced, even between parties of different nations.  This has long been possible with the international Law Merchant, in which disputes between merchants of different countries are settled in neutral, largely private arbitration proceedings.

Today, for example, private arbitration is frequently conducted in accordance with the rules of the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), or the American Arbitration Association (AAA).  In addition, dispute resolution and other aspects of foreign trade are buttressed to some extent by the foreign trade framework established by multilateral agreements such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and its successor, the World Trade Organization (WTO).  Thus, private parties have been and continue to be able to rely on and enforce the contracts necessary for foreign trade.

Foreign direct investment is another matter.  Companies investing in other countries are not able to rely on private measures such as arbitration agreements to ensure that the host state (the state hosting foreign investment) does not interfere with investments. States have sovereignty over property within their territory, and thus foreign investment is always subject to the threat of expropriation by the host state. Investing in foreign regimes is thus said to be subject to “political risk,” especially in those states with a history of hostility to capitalism and property rights, such as the former communist states and other developing economies. [continue reading…]

  1. LL.M., University of London; J.D., M.S., B.S., Louisiana State University.  The author is a member of the Intellectual Property Department and International Law Practice Group of Schnader Harrison Segal & Lewis in Philadelphia, and co-author Protecting Foreign Investment Under International Law: Legal Aspects of Political Risk (Dobbs Ferry, New York: Oceana Publications, 1997).  Email: [email protected]; http://www.shsl.com.  The views expressed herein are those of the author alone, and should not be attributed to any other person or entity. []
  2. New York Times, 21 August 1960, § 3(F), p. 1, quoted in Eric N. Baklanoff, Expropriation of U.S. Investment in Cuba, Mexico, and Chile 112 (1975). []
  3. Robert Heilbroner, “The Triumph of Capitalism,” The New Yorker, Jan. 23, 1989, p. 98.  The superiority of capitalism over socialism had been rigorously proved back in 1920 by the great Austrian economist Ludwig von Mises.  See Ludwig von Mises, Economic Calculation in the Socialist Commonwealth (1990) (1920); see also Ludwig von Mises, Socialism: An Economic and Sociological Analysis (J. Kahane trans., 3d rev’d ed. 1981) (1922).  Mises’s ideas were initially thought to have been refuted by socialist economists, in what is known as the “socialist calculation debate.”  The false conclusion that the socialists won the debate by disproving Mises’s claims was perpetuated in the following decades by economists such as Heilbroner.  See, e.g., Robert Heilbroner, Between Capitalism and Socialism (1970), pp. 88-93, in which Heilbroner claimed that Mises was wrong, that socialist economic calculation was possible, and that the “superior performance” of socialism would “soon reveal the outmoded inadequacy of a free enterprise economy.”  Despite decades of unjust and unfortunate neglect, Mises has finally been vindicated by the universally acknowledged failure of socialism as a viable economic system.  See Gertrude E. Schroeder, “The Dismal Fate of Soviet-Type Economies: Mises Was Right,” Cato J., v. 11, no. 1 (Spring/Summer 1991), p. 13; “Labor Party leader flips on policy,” Philadelphia Inquirer, Apr. 8, 1997, p. A2 (describing the British Labor Party’s endorsement of privatization of state-owned enterprises and recent elimination of a Marxist clause in its constitution advocating common ownership of the means of production).  Even Heilbroner now admits: “It turns out, of course, that Mises was right.”  Robert Heilbroner, “After Communism,” The New Yorker, Sept. 10, 1990, p. 91, 92.  See also Mark Skousen, “‘Just because socialism has lost does not meant that capitalism has won’: Interview with Robert L. Heilbroner,” Forbes, May 27, 1991, p. 130.  For further discussion of the socialist calculation debate, see Murray N. Rothbard, “The End of Socialism and the Calculation Debate Revisited,” 5 Rev. Austrian Econ. 51 (1991); Don Lavoie, Rivalry and Central Planning: The Socialist Calculation Debate Reconsidered (1985); David Ramsay Steele, From Marx to Mises: Post-Capitalist Society and the Challenge of Economic Calculation (1992). []
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